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Abstract
This work discusses three counties in Georgia during the secession crisis from
Abraham Lincoln‟s election in November 1860 until Georgia seceded from the Union in
January 1861. The focus of this paper originally began with Thomas County, Georgia,
the only county in southwest Georgia not to vote for secession. Research began with the
simple idea of finding out why Thomas County‟s citizens opposed secession. Dougherty
and Muscogee counties were included to add a broader scope to the research and make
the paper more useful for comparison to other counties in Georgia. By using
methodology consist with historical research, the conclusion of this paper is that the
secession debate in Georgia was simply a continuation of the political fighting between
Democrats and Whigs that had occurred in the state since the 1830s. Thus, political
allegiance played a vital role in determining support for, or opposition to, secession in
these three counties.
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Introduction
Not long after Abraham Lincoln‟s election as President in November 1860, a
group of men convened a meeting in the southern part of Dougherty County, located in
southwest Georgia. Described as a group of mostly planters, that is, owners of twenty or
more slaves, the purpose of the meeting was to decide what the people of the county
should tell their state‟s leaders concerning the crisis. These Dougherty County citizens
made it obvious what they wanted: “the most speedy and certain redress for all past and
present political grievances, and the most sure guarantee against further
aggressions…IMMEDIATE AND INDEPENDENT SECESSION.” The fact that these
men capitalized these last three words not only emphasizes their wants and desires but
also emphasizes the internal debate in this and every Georgia county. While they “would
be glad to have Georgia unite with any one or more” of their fellow southern states in “a
Southern Confederacy,” these men wanted action now. They further felt that those who
favored cooperation or outright Unionism were cowards and conspirators. However, this
language was not something new due to the crisis of the times. In fact, the debate in
Georgia over secession was a continuation of the political in-fighting that had occurred in
the state for years. Instead of being labeled Whigs and Democrats, the two warring
factions were now called Cooperationists and Immediate Secessionists. While past works
on the secession crisis in Georgia have attributed the intense debate in the state to
geography, class conflict, and sectionalism, most authors have failed to see the obvious:
when it came down to it, the internal debate regarding secession was simply another
battle of political allegiance.
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The debates concerning why the South seceded began almost immediately and
continue to this day. Recent evidence has shown that there were divisions amongst
southerners regarding secession.1 Nowhere was this truer than in Georgia. While much
of the South has been seen as having a one-party system, in Georgia a two-party system
had emerged in the 1820s.2 This two-party system would stay intact and would end up
being integral to sentiment regarding secession after Abraham Lincoln‟s election in 1860.
Many former Whigs were opposed to secession while most Democrats were in favor of
immediate secession from the Union, regardless of geography, social status, or economic
standing. This was most certainly the case in Dougherty, Muscogee, and Thomas
counties, located in southwest Georgia. The vast majority of Thomas County voters were
opposed to secession, including many of the large slaveholders, who, in other areas, have
often been seen as the main supporters of secession. After examining numerous primary
sources, but focusing on newspapers and memoirs, it becomes obvious that Thomas
County citizens opposed secession primarily because of their political affiliation. Their
past support of Whig politicians ended up trumping their role as citizens of a county with
a majority black population. However, this same political affiliation provided the
rationale for the large-scale support of secession in Dougherty and Muscogee counties,
two Democratic strongholds. Thus, this paper argues that political affiliation played a
key role in determining the level of support for secession in these three Georgia counties.
1

For a fairly thorough discussion of the historiography of the debates on why the Lower South seceded as
it did, see Ralph A. Wooster, “The Secession of the Lower South: An Examination of Changing
Interpretations,” Civil War History 7 (1961): 117-127.
2
See Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Emergence of the One-Party South: The Election of 1860,” in
Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). Some
recent scholarship has disagreed with aspects of Lipset‟s thesis, but most scholars do not disagree with his
overall conclusions. Most important for this work is Peyton McCrary and others, “Class and Party in the
Secession Crisis: Voting Behavior in the Deep South, 1856-1861,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 8
(Winter 1978), 429-457, which argues that Georgia and Alabama most certainly had two-party systems.
Perhaps not coincidentally, those two states had close votes on secession.
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The three counties were chosen for specific reasons. Thomas County was the
original focus of the research for this study because Thomas County was literally the only
county in southwest Georgia that voted for cooperationist candidates and opposed
secession. However, in order to expand the study, it was felt that at least two other
counties should be added to the scope of the research. When debating which counties to
add to the study, several factors were considered including support of secession,
geographic location, comparability to Thomas County in terms of population and
economy, and the amount of sources available. Dougherty was chosen because of its
proximity to Thomas County, its similarity in population and economic make-up, and its
large-scale support of secession, which was in direct contrast with Thomas. Muscogee
County was chosen because it was the largest southwest Georgia county in terms of
population, economic strength, and sources available. Furthermore, while Muscogee
eventually voted for secessionist candidates by a large majority, the county still had many
prominent, vocal cooperationists and even outright Unionists. Thus, it was felt Muscogee
represents a more middle-of-the-ground county than some other southwest Georgia
counties that lacked sources. In addition, due to Columbus, it was felt that Muscogee was
a good example of a Georgia county with a large city and, thus, could be comparable to
Bibb (Macon), Fulton (Atlanta), Richmond (Augusta), and Chatham (Savannah) counties.
This would make the study more useful as a comparison for future examinations of the
secession debate in Georgia.
The counties were also chosen based upon their population statistics, in order to
attempt to make the study more universal to expand to other parts of Georgia and the
Lower South. Muscogee County was partially chosen because it had the highest
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population of the southwest Georgia counties, but also because it had a population made
up of less than 50 percent slaves. Thomas and Dougherty counties, however, did have a
majority population of slaves, but to differing degrees. Thomas County had a population
of roughly 56 percent slaves according to the 1860 Census while Dougherty County had a
population of approximately 73 percent slaves on the eve of secession. This makes all
three counties better suited for a comparative study because they were not all alike, thus
making the conclusions herein more effective. Furthermore, Thomas County had a total
population of just under 11,000 residents while Dougherty was smaller, with just over
8,200 residents. Muscogee was the third largest county (out of 132) in terms of
population, Thomas was 26th and Dougherty was 55th. Thus, the counties are nicely
interspersed in terms of total population, making them more useful for a comparison to
other Georgia counties.3
Despite Georgia‟s importance in the South as a whole, and as the leading Lower
South state, there has only been one book-length study of the secession debate, Michael
P. Johnson‟s Toward a Patriarchal Republic: The Secession of Georgia. Published in
1977, Johnson argues that slavery had risen to a priority even greater than that of
preservation of the Union and that secession was a rational decision based upon the
leadership of the planter elite. Johnson further argues that the planters were motivated to
do this because they feared fellow slaveholders, and especially non-slaveholders, could
be won over by Republican rhetoric, especially in the form of patronage enticements.
Essentially, secessionist leaders led Georgia out of the Union to forestall this potential
internal discord. While fitting many of Johnson‟s parameters , Thomas County did not fit
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University of Virginia Historical Census Browser, http://mapserver.lib.virginia.edu/, accessed July 17,
2009.

5
within his thesis as many of the surviving records show the planter elite in that county
most assuredly did not support secession. Johnson‟s work is insightful and engaging but
does have some flaws in its interpretation. For example, Johnson plays up class conflict
as a reason for Georgia‟s secession much more than the evidence supports. Furthermore,
Johnson‟s assertion that immediate secessionists feared other white Georgians seems a
drastic overstatement of the evidence Johnson has found, especially since the majority of
the evidence contradicts Johnson. That aside, this is the standard work on the topic, if for
nothing else than the fact that no one else has tackled it.4
Another study that deals with the time period in detail is a dissertation by Luke
Fain Crutcher. Crutcher‟s “Disunity and Dissolution: The Georgia Parties and the Crisis
of the Union, 1859-1861” makes a similar argument to this paper in that Crutcher asserts
that party affiliation ended up playing a key role in an individual‟s feelings on secession.
Crutcher‟s work is an interesting counterpoint to Johnson‟s because he points to several
“planter elites” that did not support secession, even once it was obvious Georgia was
going to secede. Crutcher‟s work is similar to this study, but on more of a macro level.
Featuring excellent writing and research, Crutcher‟s work stands alongside Johnson‟s as
the standard works on the subject.5
A number of other works on either Georgia or secession were consulted, but most
provide background rather than direct light upon the secession debate in Southwest
Georgia. Anthony Gene Carey‟s Parties, Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia
was published in 1997 and gives an excellent background to the politics of antebellum

4

Michael P. Johnson, Toward a Patriarchal Republic: The Secession of Georgia (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1977).
5
Luke F. Crutcher, “Disunity and Dissolution: The Georgia Parties and the Crisis of the Union, 18591861” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles, 1974).
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Georgia. Carey also devotes his final chapter and much of his conclusion to discussing
secession in Georgia. His conclusions on secession are in direct contrast to Johnson in
that Carey feels there was little internal discord amongst Georgians beyond typical party
battles. In Carey‟s estimation, from the 1820s onward, Georgians battled for political
office and that is what happened again in 1860-61. While this sounds similar to the
argument being made in this paper, my conclusions differ from Carey‟s slightly in that he
feels that past political allegiance held little sway in the choosing of delegates to the state
convention in January 1861. William Freehling‟s The Road to Disunion, Volume II:
Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861 and David Potter‟s The Impending Crisis are both
considered seminal works on secession and were consulted for background details,
although neither focus heavily on Georgia. Potter and Freehling were two of the first
historians to theorize that secession was not all that popular in the Lower South. While
their interpretations are still debated, both are landmark studies. Freehling and Craig
Simpson edited Secession Debated: Georgia’s Showdown in 1860, which features
speeches that encompass the thought of both secessionists and cooperationists. A speech
by Muscogee County‟s Henry L. Benning is included. Published in 1953, T. Conn
Bryan‟s Confederate Georgia has a useful opening chapter on secession, although it is
very broad.6
As for the individual counties, there was a surprising wealth of information for all
three. Muscogee County had easily the most primary and secondary sources, thanks
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Anthony Gene Carey, Parties, Slavery, and the Union in Antebellum Georgia (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, 1997); William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion, Vol. II: Secessionists Triumphant,
1854-1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); David Potter, The Impending Crisis (New York:
Harper Perennial, 1977); William Freehling and Craig Simpson, eds., Secession Debated: Georgia’s
Showdown in 1860 (New York: Oxford University Press USA, 1992); T. Conn Bryan, Confederate
Georgia (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1953).
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mainly to the presence of Columbus. Some of the better general studies are John S.
Lupold, Columbus, Georgia, 1828-1978; Joseph B. Mahan, Columbus: Georgia’s Fall
Line Trading Town; Margaret L. Whitehead and Barbara Bogart, City of Progress: A
History of Columbus, Georgia; John H. Martin, Columbus, Geo., from Its Selection as a
“Trading Town” in 1827, to its Partial Destruction by Wilson’s Raid in 1865; Nancy
Telfair, A History of Columbus, Georgia, 1828-1928; and Etta Blanchard Worsley,
Columbus on the Chattahoochee. Of the group, Lupold‟s work is probably the best as he
is the only trained historian of the group and the others all have some factual errors
regarding the period studied. The best work on Columbus‟ role in the Confederacy is
Stewart C. Edwards‟ “River City at War: Columbus, Georgia, in the Confederacy,” a
doctoral dissertation from 1998. Edwards devotes a substantial number of pages to the
founding of Columbus and its attitudes toward secession from 1850 until Lincoln‟s
election.7 In addition to these secondary sources, the newspapers of Columbus were
vital. The Columbus Sun, Times, Enquirer, and The Corner Stone are all available on
microfilm and are heavily quoted throughout this work. These papers were especially
useful because they all espoused various opinions on secession and featured excellent
letters to the editor.
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John S. Lupold, Columbus, Georgia, 1828-1978 (Columbus: Columbus Sesquicentennial, 1978); Joseph
B. Mahan, Columbus: Georgia’s Fall Line Trading Town (Northridge, CA: Windsor, 1976); Margaret L.
Whitehead and Barbara Bogart, City of Progress: A History of Columbus, Georgia (Columbus: Columbus
Office Supply Co., 1978); John H. Martin, Columbus, Geo., from Its Selection as a “Trading Town” in
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The two works on Columbus‟ role in the Confederacy are Diffee William Standard, Columbus, Georgia, in
the Confederacy (New York: William-Frederick Press, 1954) and Stewart C. Edwards, “River City at War:
Columbus, Georgia, in the Confederacy” (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1998).
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The research on Thomas County owes a debt of gratitude to former Florida State
University professor William Warren Rogers, who has produced four books on the
county‟s history and another two on plantations located in the county. Two of these
works, Ante-Bellum Thomas County and Thomas County During the Civil War, were
relied upon heavily. Rogers also wrote an article, titled “The Way They Were: Thomas
Countians in 1860,” that gives excellent information on the county on the eve of
secession. Although two newspapers were published in the county at the time, the
Thomasville Southern Enterprise is the only paper extant. However, this paper was very
useful because it represented the majority of the citizens of the county due to its backing
of John Bell in the 1860 Presidential election and cooperationist candidates.
Furthermore, the Southern Enterprise was the more popular newspaper in the county with
a much larger circulation that its Democratic competitor.8
Perhaps thanks to the fact that Albany became the leading economic center of
extreme southwest Georgia, there is a wealth of information on Dougherty County.
There are two secondary sources that stand out. First, The Historical Background of
Dougherty County, 1836-1940, was compiled by the Works Progress Administration and
features excellent work on antebellum Dougherty County. Second, Susan O‟Donovan‟s
“Transforming Work: Slavery, Free Labor, and the Household in Southwest Georgia,
1850-1880” is a doctoral dissertation that does not focus on politics, but it features
excellent primary source research and a good chapter on Dougherty County (which
features a bit of information on Thomas) during the secession period. Much like Thomas
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William Warren Rogers, Ante-Bellum Thomas County, 1825-1861 (Tallahassee: Florida State University
Press, 1963); Rogers, Thomas County During the Civil War (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press,
1964); Rogers, “The Way They Were: Thomas Countians in 1860,” Georgia Historical Quarterly (Summer
1976, No. 2), 131-144.
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County, only one newspaper survives from the time period, although the Albany Patriot
was the only newspaper published in the county. Enjoying a wide circulation, the Patriot
was certainly influential and was stridently secessionist. It offers an excellent
counterpoint to the Southern Enterprise, which was probably the Patriot‟s chief rival in
terms of readership in the most southern parts of Georgia.9
This study is significant because Georgia was the most important state in the
Lower South. Thus, understanding the issues involved in the secession debate in Georgia
is vital to understanding why Georgia, and potentially other southern states, had such a
fierce, close contest regarding secession. Looking at these three counties as a microhistory is helpful for several reasons. First, all three counties could be considered very
typical of other parts of Georgia and the entire South. Second, despite these similarities,
all three counties, and especially Muscogee due to its industrialization and the large city
of Columbus and Dougherty due to its wealth, had features that make their individual
experience relevant to counties with similar make-ups in other parts of the South.
Finally, in order to understand the debate in Georgia at the macro level as Michael P.
Johnson, Anthony Gene Carey and Luke Crutcher attempted, one must be able to
understand the debate “on the ground” at the micro level. Through studying these three
counties individually at the micro level, it becomes apparent that all three counties
discussed similar issues, although they all came to differing conclusions based on those
issues. Still, this shows the importance of this study because these counties‟ thoughts on
secession came from the discussion of the same issues. It also became apparent after
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Works Progress Administration, Historical Background of Dougherty County, 1836-1940 (Atlanta:
Cherokee Publishing Company, 1981); Susan E. O‟Donovan, “Transforming Work: Slavery, Free Labor,
and the Household in Southwest Georgia, 1850-1880” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego,
1997).
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studying these three counties in significant detail that party affiliation played a key role in
county-wide support for or opposition to secession.

Chapter One-The Build-Up to Secession: Georgia in the 1850s
Georgia was a key state in the Lower South when the secession debate reached its
crescendo due to its population, political leaders, and economy. However, the secession
crisis of 1860-1861 was not the first time the “Empire State of the South” was to play a
central role in the discussion of disunion. The prospect of secession had risen during the
Nullification Crisis of the 1830s but the debate that eventually led to the Compromise of
1850 saw Georgia take a leadership role among the Lower South states on the issue of
disunion. This leadership role would see Georgia help stave off secession in 1850, which
would lead fire-eaters to question whether Georgia would make the leap out of the Union
in 1861.
Soon after the Mexican War ended, debate raged between the North and South
over whether the annexed Mexican territory would be allowed to permit slavery. Much
of the acrimonious debate in Georgia, and throughout the South for that matter, revolved
around John Calhoun‟s idea of a regional, southern political party in the wake of northern
agitation against slavery spreading to the territories. The crisis of the times led prominent
Georgia Democrats such as Herschel Johnson, Henry Benning, and Wilson Lumpkin to
advocate for such a political party to present ultimatums to northern states, force
recognition of southern rights, and defeat the enemies of slavery. However, some
Democrats, including Howell Cobb and John Lumpkin, refused to join this tide and kept
faith in a national Democratic party. Cobb lamented that Calhoun‟s followers wanted
“the dissolution of the democratic party, whether the Union is preserved or not”; for his
part, Lumpkin was sick of “Calhoun, Calhoun men, and Calhounism.” The Whigs,
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meanwhile, simply waited, pinning their hopes on President Zachary Taylor‟s course of
action with the annexed territory.10
Taylor ended up disappointing Southern Whigs by surrounding himself with
potential supporters, no matter their party, and tended to slight old Whigs. Before 1850
even began, men such as Robert Toombs and Alexander Stephens had left the Whig
caucus after having a resolution declaring the party‟s opposition to the congressional
prohibition of slavery in California and New Mexico tabled. Toombs went so far as to
announce that he was for disunion if the Wilmot Proviso passed. With Taylor advocating
immediate statehood for California and New Mexico, Georgia‟s Whigs were left with the
decision of backing the President as their link to the national Whig Party or abandoning
him for their own electoral survival. Some, like the editor of the Columbus Enquirer,
advocated sticking with the national party since there was no chance of slavery being
established in California anyway. Others thought they could oppose the policy while still
claiming allegiance to Taylor while a final group considered abandoning Taylor and the
national Whigs altogether.11
With southern rights advocates calling for a convention at Nashville in June 1850
and the Georgia legislature passing resolutions that recommended a state convention to
determine the state‟s response to the possibility of the Wilmot Proviso passing, the Whigs
appeared to be in trouble. With the exception of Howell Cobb, most of Georgia‟s
political leaders, both Whig and Democrat, were beginning to line up against the national
parties and Taylor. With the real prospect of disunion on the horizon and Georgians from
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Robert P. Brooks, ed., “Howell Cobb Papers,” Georgia Historical Quarterly (June 1921, No. 5), 39-52;
Carey, Parties, Slavery, and the Union…, 156-158.
11
Columbus Enquirer, August 7, 1849; Carey, Parties, Slavery, and the Union…, 157-159.
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north to south outraged by the potential admission of California, Henry Clay offered an
avenue of escape to the moderates.
On January 29, 1850, Clay presented proposals to admit California as a free state,
organize New Mexico and Utah as territories without restrictions on the adoption of
slavery, adjust Texas‟ boundary and pay its public debt, end the slave trade in the District
of Columbia but not abolish slavery there, and pass a more effective fugitive slave law.
Clay‟s proposal was debated for months, but it was important to Georgia‟s moderates
because it gave them an alternative to being simply for or against Taylor‟s policy.
Toombs, who had threatened disunion just a month earlier, now felt Congress could
probably come to a compromise. Others, including Senator John Berrien, criticized
Clay‟s proposals and drifted toward an anti-compromise camp. The Whigs were
heartened by the fact that Democrats like Howell Cobb backed the forces in favor of the
compromise measures. Public sentiment, and voting, in Georgia would show that the
anti-compromise Democrats had either misread their constituents or just moved too fast.12
The public sentiment appeared to be one of weariness. After several years of
debate and fighting in Congress over the spoils of the Mexican War, Georgia‟s public
was tired of talking about it. If Clay‟s compromises could avert disunion, then it was
worth it. Many average Georgians either did not think the admission of California as a
free state threatened their interests or justified such radical discussion. This sentiment,
which was not restricted to just Georgia, would end up stifling the southern rights men
and the Nashville Convention. Nearly all Whigs wisely distanced themselves from the
convention as Democrats attempted to claim the meeting was not about disunion, but
about preserving the Union by flexing the South‟s muscles to resist aggression.
12

Carey, Parties, Slavery, and the Union…, 160-161.
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However, the editor of the Columbus Times disputed this “Southern cowardice” and
stated that if disunion occurred as a result of the Nashville meeting, “so be it.”13
The editor of the Columbus newspaper was decidedly in the minority and the
farcical voting for delegates to the Nashville Convention proved it. When the April
elections arrived, few delegates ran, leaving most candidates unopposed, and only 3,700
votes were cast in the fifty-four counties (out of the more than ninety at the time) that
even had polls open on election day. James Gardner, who had stated that Georgians
should not shrink from disunion, was forced to admit that the lack of interest shown by
the voters was a “virtual repudiation by the people of Georgia” of the proposed
convention. Eleven Georgians were chosen for the Nashville delegation, including Henry
Benning, Martin J. Crawford, and James Ramsey of Muscogee County, but five of them
were appointed by the governor, who had the ability to fill vacancies. Three Whigs were
appointed, but they were all marginal figures. Benning, Crawford, and Ramsey all
became some of the most ardent proponents of southern rights and secession at the
gathering.14
On May 8, a compromise plan was presented based upon Clay‟s original
proposals. The Nashville Convention met a month later and repudiated this plan and
formulated their own compromise plan. The Nashville proposal was to extend the
Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific Ocean with an expectation to hold slaves
anywhere south of that line. This was an interesting turn of events as Democrats in
Georgia and throughout the South had rejected the Missouri Compromise and thought a
geographical division of this kind was not possible due to northern opposition.
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15
Furthermore, the extension of the line would require congressional legislation, which
went directly against an 1848 Democratic platform espousing nonintervention on the part
of Congress. This led critics to charge that the Nashville Convention was simply out for
secession and had come up with this “compromise” knowing most northerners would not
support it. Furthermore, moderate Democrats such as Howell Cobb were convinced that
the Nashville Convention delegates and their supporters were attempting to either break
up the Democratic Party or trying to use the Democratic Party as a vehicle for secession.
Delegates to the convention proved Cobb right about their support of secession in public
speeches.15
The Muscogee trio of delegates returned home to find intense debate regarding
secession. Unionists and Southern Rights Democrats held barbecues and rallies to
attempt to win over Muscogee‟s citizens. On July 16, the states rights‟ men held a rally
that drew 3,000 people. Many speeches denouncing the North and the proposed
compromise were delivered, including one by textile mill owner John H. Howard that
was considered the most stridently pro-southern oration. Two days later, the Unionists
held their own rally that drew a similar number of people. The speakers, including future
Governor James Johnson, were adamant that the people of Georgia should support the
compromise as it could stave off the disunion that men like Howard portrayed as
inevitable.16
Walter Colquitt, one of the leading Georgia delegates to the convention, stated in
a letter in a Macon newspaper that the admission of California was a prelude to abolition
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and should be met with resistance. Supporters of men like Colquitt agreed, arguing that
the North was out to not only dominate the South but also free their slaves and put the
government in the freed slaves‟ hands. Benning advocated secession and continued to
propose the John C. Calhoun idea of an all-southern political party. In Albany, thirty
men proclaimed themselves willing to go to a proposed Southern Rights meeting in
Macon and advocated immediate secession. The Columbus Times continued to be one of
the most radical newspapers in the state, asking if southerners had fallen so low that they
were willing to accept any compromise “our masters choose to give us?” The Times
played their trump card when asking, “Are we already enslaved?”17
Whigs and moderate Democrats retorted by agreeing that the compromise
measures were imperfect, but accepting them would forestall disunion and kill the
Wilmot Proviso. The compromise supporters made two key points here. First, California
was going to be a free state whether that was determined by the people or by Congress.
Second, by accepting the compromise, the rest of the Southwest would be open to slavery
and the South would get a better fugitive slave law. Both Whigs and Democrats in favor
of the compromise advocated the nonintervention of Congress as a laudable alternative.
Some, like Alexander Stephens, did not think the compromise much of a compromise at
all, but thought it would “quiet the country” and, more importantly, “the proviso is not in
it.”18
The death of Zachary Taylor elevated Millard Fillmore to President and allowed
men such as Cobb, Toombs, and Stephens to work together to pass the Compromise of
17
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1850. However, sectional antagonism may have actually been exacerbated, rather than
alleviated, by the compromise. Most northerners still were opposed to the fugitive slave
law and the lack of the inclusion of the Wilmot Proviso. Many southerners disliked the
admission of California and the barring of the slave trade from Washington, D.C. The
compromise did not unify and this led southern Whigs to rail at their northern
counterparts for not supporting the compromise while southern Democrats were angered
by their northern counterparts for supporting the compromise. This led some of the party
ties in Georgia to collapse, although the old rivalries remained.
The struggle going forward would be between those who supported the
compromise and those who did not, even if they did not label themselves Whigs and
Democrats anymore. Former Whigs and Democrats did begin to form alliances and work
together, but when the governor called for a state convention to discuss what Georgia
should do in the wake of California‟s admission, the battle began anew. This time, the
fight would be between Southern Rights men and Unionists. Some Southern Rights
candidates and supporters, chief amongst them the always rabid Columbus Times, called
for immediate secession as the remedy. The Albany Patriot reported that the county‟s
citizens were wary of disunion but made clear that Congress needed to keep the South in
mind when discussing territorial questions. However, most Southern Rights advocates
had learned from the Nashville Convention and knew that the greater part of the populace
did not support disunion. In light of this, the disunionists called for resistance, the
meaning of which Southern Rights leaders never really clarified. However, one
somewhat brilliant maneuver the Southern Rights men pulled off was claiming that
bowing down to the North and opposing a regional, southern political party would lead to
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secession. The rationale was that accepting the compromise would lead to aggression
which would foster secession to stave off abolition.
The Southern Rights men were scattered, though, and their most vocal
secessionist supporters often played into the hands of the Unionists. Unionists charged
that any Southern Rights men who disavowed secession were being dishonest and the
ones who called for disunion as the remedy for the South‟s ills were the ones representing
the true nature of the Southern Rights party. Equal to the tactics of their opponents, the
Unionists made a brilliant move of their own in not attempting to tell Georgians that
everything about the Compromise of 1850 was good. In fact, they were willing to admit
that parts were not all that favorable to the South. However, the Unionists relied on the
average Georgians unwillingness to chance disunion over the territories and made the
complex issues that had been debated in Congress for several years very simple: you
either thought the federal government was a failure and should be abandoned or you
thought that, although imperfect, being in the Union was better than being out of it.
Although this was a vast oversimplification of the issue, it was a wise move by
the Unionists. It made it seem that if the Southern Rights party achieved success, it
would mean fatal consequences for Georgia, the South, and the nation. The tactic
worked. By late October the Southern Rights men had garnered little support, so little
that even John Forsyth, Jr., the rabid editor of the Columbus Times, was willing to back
Toombs and Stephens. Forsyth felt that the convention should definitely lay down the
ground for what could lead to disunion in the future, but felt Georgia should remain in the
Union at the present time. Despite the presence of men like Nelson Tift, the Albany
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Patriot reported that “a very large majority” of citizens in Albany and what was then
Baker County favored remaining in the Union and opposed calls for disunion.19
The November election results would prove how wise, or business savvy, Forsyth
was to change gears. Unionists gained 243 of the 264 delegate seats and won 65 percent
of the overall vote. Despite the best efforts of Henry Benning and John Howard,
Muscogee County had voted for an entirely Unionist delegation to the convention. Even
more important than the overall Unionist vote was what emerged from the five-day
convention that met beginning December 10. The Georgia Platform came out of the
meeting and would have tremendous effects throughout the South.20
The Georgia Platform began with a preamble that praised the Compromise of
1850, although admitting parts of the compromise were flawed, and stated the admission
of California did not injure Georgia‟s honor or require secession as a response. The most
interesting part of the Platform, though, was the fourth resolution. This resolution stated
that Georgia would be willing to resist to the point of secession any act of Congress
regarding slavery that was inconsistent with the safety of the slave states, any
congressional prohibition of the intrastate slave trade, any refusal to admit a state because
it recognized slavery, any exclusion of slavery from the territories of Utah and New
Mexico, and any act repealing or altering the fugitive slave law.

Nineteen convention

delegates opposed the Platform, mainly the few Southern Rights members who felt the
entire Compromise of 1850 had been unjust. The Southern Rights leaders anticipated
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continued discord with the North which would culminate in disunion. The supporters of
the Georgia Platform thought it gave hope for peace between the sections.21
The Georgia Platform would have wide-reaching influence and repercussions.
Southern Rights campaigns in Alabama and Mississippi began in 1851 as both states
broke into similar Southern Rights and Unionist camps. The Unionists in both states
trumpeted the Georgia Platform and won large majorities in similar convention elections.
The Georgia Platform was utilized by moderates and Unionists throughout the South and
became the cornerstone of southern policy for many years. The state elections of 1851
brought the point home further as Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi elected fourteen
Unionists in the nineteen electoral races. Finally, South Carolina, still essentially a oneparty state, continued to prattle on about another southern convention meeting in 1852.
The Georgia Platform had proven so successful across the Deep South that even in South
Carolina, interest in the convention was minimal and it would never meet.22
The greatest failure of the Georgia Platform, however, was that it never led to a
unified Union party. Georgia political leaders such as Toombs and Stephens wanted such
a party to exist, but other Georgians like Howell Cobb felt like the Unionists should just
be absorbed by the national Democratic Party. In fact, the Democrats would effectively
add the Georgia Platform to their policy, thus making the Democrats look like the
moderate, true defenders of slavery when a scant time earlier most southern Democrats
were seen as secessionists. It was an odd turn of events and one that effectively killed the
second party in most southern states for several years. By 1853, many Unionists in
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Georgia had grudgingly merged with the Southern Rights men in a once-again unified
Democratic party. The uneasy alliance would not last for long. While they may have all
seemingly been Democrats, Georgians were not all united.23
Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois had for several years been trying to
organize the territory around Missouri in order to promote a transcontinental railroad
originating in Chicago. In January 1854, Douglas renewed those efforts when he
introduced a bill to create Kansas and Nebraska out of land lying north of the Missouri
Compromise line. To secure southern support, Douglas added language to his bill that
would make the Missouri Compromise null and void and would open Kansas and
Nebraska to slavery under the auspice of popular sovereignty. At first, this pleased many
Georgia politicians as they had been advocating for the right to take their slaves into the
territories without congressional interference since 1846. However, the Kansas-Nebraska
Act would go a long way toward propelling the nation toward disunion due to the furor
that surrounded it. And not too inconsequentially, Douglas‟ act would directly lead to the
creation of the Republican Party.
When Douglas first announced his proposal, the politicians and people of Georgia
were happy at the prospect of the Missouri Compromise line being repealed, which they
felt had unconstitutionally restricted their property rights. Stephens, Toombs, Cobb, and
other Georgia politicians backed up Douglas‟ argument that the Kansas-Nebraska bill
simply espoused the ideas of popular sovereignty and congressional nonintervention that
had appeared in the 1850 compromise bill four years earlier. Some Southern Rights men
also saw the parallel between Douglas‟ and Clay‟s proposals and found them
objectionable. James Bethune founded The Corner Stone in Columbus at this time,
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which was one of the first newspapers to advocate the immediate dissolution of the
Union, partly in disgust over the Kansas-Nebraska fight. Congressman James Lindsay
Seward, a Democrat from Thomas County, had been serving in state or national office
since 1835 and was one of the few hard-line Southern Rights men to immediately speak
out against Douglas‟ bill. Seward and Bethune were clearly in the minority, though, as in
February 1854 the Georgia legislature unanimously resolved that opposition to the
Kansas-Nebraska bill “is regarded by the people of Georgia as hostility to the rights of
the South.”24
At least in the halls of the Senate, the popular sentiment backed the bill, as it was
easily passed not long after the Georgia legislature made their feelings known. The
House was another matter, but thanks to maneuvering by Alexander Stephens, the bill
narrowly passed in late May 1854. The vote made it obvious that any chance of a
national Whig Party was dead as all northern Whigs opposed the bill. On the other hand,
half of the northern Democrats voted for the bill, making southern Democrats feel as if a
national party could still work. This led Georgia Democrats to ask their opponents to
abandon the Whig Party, which most already had, and unite with them under the
Democratic banner. Alexander Stephens, who had allied with the Democrats to pass the
bill, spoke for many southern Whigs when he said that the former Whigs would prefer a
national organization that represented their interests, but he still was not sure the
Democratic Party was it.25
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The importance of the Kansas-Nebraska Act passing for southerners was more in
theory than in practice. Although some held hope that slavery could be extended to
Kansas, climate and soil made most southerners believe slavery would never be taken to
Nebraska. Because of this, Georgians and southerners were shocked when the reaction to
the bill by northerners was one of outrage. Many southerners heartened themselves
thinking the only northerners opposing the bill were anti-slavery fanatics who did not
understand that the Act was no victory for slavery. However, this would prove to be
naïve as the events led to a political revolution in the North. Out of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act would come the Know-Nothing and anti-Nebraska fusion parties.26
These new parties would have detrimental effects for southerners. The KnowNothings were nativists and anti-Catholics and called for reforms to keep “foreigners”
from voting. The anti-Nebraska groups mobilized a diverse group of people and interests
behind their opposition to the Act and the “slave power.” The two groups would
eventually join with Whigs to battle Democrats for electoral supremacy in the North. As
early as late 1854, the Whigs and their new allies began to maul the Democrats in
elections. Southern Democrats were shocked at this turn of events because it was leaving
them short of allies in the North as northern Democrats began to distance themselves
from their southern party comrades in an attempt to stave off the nativist, anti-southern
ideals the new opposition often espoused.27
Georgia Democrats had even bigger problems when the Know-Nothing Party
began to spread southward. As early as June 1854, councils of the party began to sprout
up in the state. Know-Nothing candidates in the state capital of Milledgeville and
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Augusta even won electoral victories in early 1855. Other areas did not have politicians
run as Know-Nothings or actively promote the group, but many old Whig supporters and
newspapers supported the group. This caused consternation for many Democrats, but the
Know Nothing Party never achieved as much support in Georgia as it did further North.
Still, the movement was important even in the South because former Whigs were willing
to support the Know-Nothings, even tacitly, simply because they opposed the Democrats.
With no real national rival to the Democratic Party, Georgians like Alexander Stephens
hoped the Know-Nothings could defeat the Democrats. For their part, northern KnowNothings were willing to try to find some common ground to form a national party.28
In Philadelphia in June 1855, a group of delegates convened to attempt to form a
national party, consisting mainly of northern Know-Nothings and former Whigs from the
South. The American Party, as the Know-Nothings named themselves at the gathering,
got off to a respectable start as many northern members were willing to find an issue that
all could agree upon, despite their anti-slavery leanings. However, sectional differences
would eventually cause problems as northerners balked at supporting a section of the
platform that implied endorsement of the Kansas-Nebraska Act. Southerners insisted
upon this section being included and this caused many northerners to leave the
convention. Georgian members of the party attempted to make the best of it by claiming
those who had bolted were abolitionists anyway and pointed out that this allowed the
section in question to be adopted into the platform. If nothing else, the American Party
gave anti-Democrats an alternative to stay in the Union with slavery intact. Because of
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this, the American Party was able to make in-roads in Georgia as the only viable
alternative to the Democrats.29
The Democrats, and even some old Whigs, attacked the Know-Nothings due to
their secretive nature almost immediately. Georgia Democrats called the Know-Nothings
in the state nothing but Whigs with a new name. They further were upset by the secretive
nature of the organization and, perhaps due to the lack of Catholics in Georgia outside of
Savannah, the Democrats were also opposed to the Know-Nothings‟ attacks on religious
freedom. Even Alexander Stephens, despite the fact he hoped they could be a viable
alternative to Democrats, found the Know-Nothings to be dangerous because he thought
their political secrecy was anti-republican. The greatest charge thrown at the KnowNothings, though, was their bearing on slavery. Stephens, Toombs, and James Gardner
all stated that they felt the incoming foreigners the Know-Nothings battled against were a
northern problem. Furthermore, they all felt that the Know-Nothing proposal to force
immigrants to go through a longer naturalization process left them in a state between
slaves and citizens. This limbo status blurred the distinction between slaves and whites
and Stephens, for one, felt there was no place for a degraded class of white people within
American society.30
Perhaps the larger majority of southerners, though, simply saw the KnowNothings as a group of northern abolitionists who hid behind nativist speeches. Some
Democratic newspapers went as far as to warn southerners who might be taken in by the
Know-Nothings to be wary of the party because they could be planning to launch
abolitionist attacks, through southern members of the American Party, in the South.
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Democrats stressed that the defense of southern liberty and honor could only occur in the
open, something the American Party still refused to do. All of this led many Georgians
and southerners to believe that any northerner who was not a Democrat was an
abolitionist. The rationale was that any northerner not willing to express his views in
public must be up to something.31
Despite the debate regarding this new political party, much of the focus in 1855
turned toward events in Kansas. Ever since the Kansas-Nebraska Act had passed, the
race had been on to settle Kansas and make it either a free or slave state. In the North,
emigrant aid societies paid for non-slaveholders to settle the territory. Meanwhile,
proslavery Missourians rallied to repel what they viewed as an abolitionist invasion. On
March 30, 1855, thousands of Missourians crossed the border to vote in Kansas‟
territorial election. The legislature chosen by this fraudulent vote was overwhelmingly
proslavery and quickly passed laws protecting slavery in the territory. These political
ploys would occur continuously for several years and, along with intermittent outbreaks
of violence, hastened the development of the Republican Party.
With the possibility of Kansas equalizing the ratio of free and slave states in the
Union, southerners suddenly stepped up their claims for the territory. Many Georgians
wanted the territory to eventually become a slave state, but they were willing to concede
its loss to the North only if Congress did not interfere in the settlement process. The June
1855 state Democratic convention argued that if Congress did not admit Kansas as a state
under the current proslavery legislature, it could lead to a disruption “of all the ties that
bind the State of Georgia to the Union.” A newspaper editor in Albany agreed, stating
that the South could leave the Union if “those Northern States” continued to exhibit a
31
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“disposition to withhold from us our Constitutional rights.” The American Party jumped
on the issue too, as they argued they could succeed in admitting Kansas as a slave state
where the Democrats had surely failed. The thinking was that the South needed allies in
the North and the American Party was more likely to be that ally than the Northern
Democrats. Both sides in Georgia were offering protection for slavery and southern
rights as the 1855 election for governor ramped up.32
With the American Party unable to provide concrete proof that they could provide
national political strength for Georgia and the South, Democrat Herschel Johnson won
the governor‟s office with 52 percent of the vote. While the vote was not overwhelming,
Johnson had gained on his 1853 victory in every region of the state while his opponents
had lost nearly 4,000 votes.33 The loss in Georgia was an example of the American
Party‟s results in the South, where the Democrats crushed the Americans in every state
except Tennessee.
The year 1856 began with crises for the South as a Republican won a protracted
battle in Congress for the Speaker of the House. Further west, Kansas had been divided
into two hostile camps: proslavery men who backed the legislature in Lecompton and
anti-slavery, “free-soilers” who had established a second government under the Topeka
constitution. Intermittent bouts of violence continued, with the pinnacle being the murder
of five proslavery men at the hands of John Brown, a self-proclaimed holy warrior
against slavery, and his followers in May. This led many in Kansas on both sides to
believe civil war was at hand and citizen armies were formed. Columbus newspapers
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reported in April that a group of residents had left for Kansas to bolster the proslavery
forces. Politically, southerners, including Alexander Stephens, argued that the
Lecompton government was the legitimate one because it had won the election; he
argued that the free-soilers were simply sore losers. Republicans and most northerners
found this laughable and claimed that the Lecompton government had obviously been
elected illegally. Toombs offered a moderate solution which proposed a constitutional
convention in Kansas under conditions that anti-slavery leaders viewed as fair. This was
the greatest concessions a pro-slavery senator would offer, but Toombs‟ and other
moderate solutions were killed by sectional animosity.34
The threat of a Republican Presidential victory in 1856 actually led Georgians
apart rather than together. The American Party, both nationally and in Georgia, chose
Millard Fillmore as their candidate. In an odd turn of events, the Georgian American
Party had broken from the national group but had still chosen Fillmore. The Georgians
wrote up a proslavery platform they said Fillmore backed. The Democrats chose James
Buchanan as their candidate and although many Georgia Democrats hoped Franklin
Pierce would be chosen for a second term, Buchanan was seen as a moderate with
southern sympathies. The threat of John C. Frémont and the Republicans was not
enough to bring Georgians together, though, as the Fillmore and Buchanan supporters
painted the opposing candidate as soft on slavery and no better than Frémont. The
American Party supporters further argued that their Democratic opponents had been
duped by their northern “allies” who were just as anti-slavery as the Republicans. Many
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American Party members hoped this type of rhetoric would split the Democratic Party
apart before the election.35
Such a split did not occur, however. Although Democrats both North and South
had differing interpretations of what popular sovereignty meant, they avoided fighting
over this. Instead, southern Democrats rallied behind the fact that northern Democrats, at
least some, had helped win the Kansas-Nebraska fight. The Democrats also shot back at
the Americans, claiming their opponents were without solutions to the problems they
raged about. Many Georgia Democrats made a simpler appeal: the only way to defeat
the Republicans and avert the crisis that would occur afterwards was for southerners to
back the Democrats and Buchanan. Many moderates and former Whigs took the bait and
agreed, announcing their support for Buchanan and deriding the American Party.36
What resulted in Georgia was an easy victory for James Buchanan. The
Democrat took home 57 percent of the vote and won 89 out of 118 counties. More
impressively, Buchanan was even able to win many black belt areas that the Whigs had
formerly dominated. The reality, though, was that Buchanan‟s overall victory had been
fueled largely by the slave states and southerners realized that the threat of the
Republican Party was certainly not over. The victory was important in Georgia because
Buchanan immediately tabbed moderate, and often new, Democrats to positions of
importance, including naming Howell Cobb Secretary of the Treasury. Old Southern
Rights leaders like Herschel Johnson were infuriated by this turn of events and felt that
Cobb and the like would betray southern rights to promote their own agendas.37
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The Dred Scott decision would have repercussions as well. Chief Justice Roger
Taney‟s decision was decidedly proslavery as he denied that persons of African descent
could be citizens, declared the Missouri Compromise line unconstitutional, and asserted
that Congress, and hence territorial legislatures, were powerless to act for or against
slavery. This undercut the Republican platform and was in total opposition to the
Northern Democrat interpretation of popular sovereignty. It also created an opportunity
for sectional issues. Georgians were happy, claiming the Supreme Court had confirmed
all of their doctrines of the past decade or more. Most northerners, however, were
appalled at Taney‟s conclusions and thought it another example of the “slave power”
controlling the government.38
At the same time, things in Kansas were coming to a head. Thousands of settlers
had poured into Kansas in 1857, further bolstering the free-soil majority. This led the
Lecompton backers to attempt to ratify the state constitution as quickly as possible and
without these new settlers having a say. The Buchanan administration urged all settlers
to vote and warned the Lecompton men that any constitution not ratified by all the people
would be rejected. The new territorial governor, Robert J. Walker, managed to alienate
southerners when he told free-soil followers that Kansas did not have the climate or soil
suitable for slavery in an attempt to encourage them to vote. This made southerners mad,
but it also did not have the effect Walker hoped for. When voting occurred to elect
delegates to ratify the constitution, nearly all free-soilers boycotted the election.39
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At a June 1857 state convention, Georgia‟s Democrats denounced Walker and
asked for his removal, but they did not implicate Buchanan and were still willing to give
the President time to turn things around in Kansas. Some Democrats, such as Cobb,
found the resolutions against Walker needless, silly, and damaging for the administration.
However, the larger issue was what was at stake. If Congress did not admit Kansas under
the Lecompton constitution, the Georgia Platform told the Empire State, and other
southern states for that matter, that the proper recourse was secession. Some Georgians
were beginning to feel that secession was inevitable at this point. Robert Hardaway, a
Muscogee County citizen who had honeymooned in the North in 1857, found northerners
to be “overbearing” and “often insulting” when discussing sectional differences.
Hardaway was sure a civil war was inevitable and felt all he could do was to return “to
my own people and await quietly the result.”40
The internal debates between Unionist and Southern Rights Democrats would
spill over into the campaign for governor in 1857. The battle for governor would become
another fight between Democrats and Americans debating who could maintain and
protect southern rights more effectively. The Democrats, running Joseph E. Brown, and
the Americans, who chose Benjamin H. Hill, both used Kansas as a campaign tool,
arguing that their party could best deal with Walker and the situation in the territory.
Georgia‟s voters believed the Democrats more, handing Brown just over 55 percent of
the popular vote. Howell Cobb, though, was busy in the background warning Democrats
that Kansas might not turn out the way southerners wanted it to. Territorial elections had
been held in October and December and they proved that the state was most certainly
ruled by free-soilers despite the presence of the Lecompton government. Northern
40
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Democrats were incensed when Buchanan accepted the Lecompton constitution anyway.
The December election had been boycotted by free-soilers and Buchanan accepted that
vote even though the October election, which had full participation by both factions, gave
a clear majority to the anti-slavery faction. Buchanan hoped his acceptance of the proslavery constitution would win him support in the South. It did to some extent, but it
ended up not being worth the support he ended up losing from the North. In the end,
Kansas was not even accepted into the Union before secession occurred, but the whole
debacle exacerbated the schism that had already begun in the Democratic Party. 41
Events in 1858 and 1859 in Georgia centered largely on the Democrats as the
American Party dwindled away and anti-Democrats searched for a way to band together.
Georgia‟s Democrats, in one way or another, were all looking to retaliate against Stephen
A. Douglas for coming out against the Lecompton constitution. Cobb also wanted to
ostracize Douglas because the Georgian wanted his own chance at the Presidency in
1860. Others, like Senator Alfred Iverson from Columbus, were willing to destroy
Douglas and the national party and cared little about it. At a July 1859 speech in Griffin,
Iverson railed that “Slavery must be maintained—in the Union, if possible—out of it if
necessary—peaceably if we may—forcibly if we must.” Iverson and his ilk planned to
build a party platform that Douglas would never support, thus denying the Illinois
Senator the chance at the Presidency that he so desired. The Southern Rights men also
thought this would bring the northern Democrats in line.42
The October 1859 raid on Harper‟s Ferry by John Brown and his followers only
strengthened the cause of men like Iverson. Brown had hoped to incite a slave
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insurrection in the South, but instead he was arrested and saw several of his followers
killed. Brown was hung, but he had a lasting effect on the South. White southerners
were terrified and horrified by Brown‟s plot they were even more appalled by the
reaction of some in the North who trumpeted Brown as a hero or martyr. A.J. Macarthy,
editor of the Albany Patriot, felt that anyone who supported Brown should be hung
“from the highest limb on the first tree” that could be found. All throughout the South,
other plots were uncovered and conspirators were only run out of town if they were
lucky. At least four men were expelled from Columbus within two months of Brown‟s
raid. Perhaps not surprisingly, many of these expulsions were mere witch hunts directed
against northerners and travelers. The plot by Brown and the subsequent reaction by
those in the North had convinced many southerners of all political persuasions that this
was all part of the Republican, abolitionist plot against the South. The editor of the
Columbus Enquirer was sure that the sympathy for Brown was proof of “the inauguration
of a bolder and better organized system of warfare by the Northern abolitionists against
the peace and property of the Southern States.” In Albany, the Albany Guards, which
had been formed in 1858 in response to events in Kansas, had begun drilling in case
abolitionists decided to invade the county. The Albany Guard urged the citizens of
Dougherty County to examine their neighborhoods to prevent an uprising. The
foundation had been set for not only further sectional animosity, but for the disintegration
of the Democratic Party over the 1860 Presidential election.43
The decade was witness to changing attitudes in the state of Georgia as a whole
and in Dougherty, Muscogee, and Thomas counties. At the beginning of the decade,
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there were certainly supporters of secession in the state, as evidenced by men like
Benning attending the Nashville Convention. However, the majority of Georgians were
not willing to take such a step as secession and the Georgia Platform only confirmed this.
When Benning ran for Congress in 1851, he was easily defeated by his Unionist
opponent. Events accelerated at such a rapid pace, though, that just a few years later
newspapers in Albany and Columbus were advocating secession if southern rights were
not upheld. Perhaps the key, though, was the breakdown of an opposing political party to
the Democrats as the 1850s progressed. With the crumbling of the national Whig Party
in the middle of the decade, Democrats began to control places like Thomas County that
they had not won since the 1840s. The lack of opposition allowed the Democrats in the
latter part of the decade to advocate for disunion as a viable option to maintain southern
rights. It appeared that the advocates of secession had a much more sympathetic
audience than they did in 1850.

Chapter Two: The Counties
Thomas County typified Georgia‟s role in the South. The county bordered the
new cotton kingdom of north Florida and was close to the black belt of Alabama. The
county‟s large plantation system and agricultural base provided significant wealth and
linked them, quite literally through the railroad, with the Atlantic seaboard. The county
was formed in 1825 and was immediately seen as an area where agriculture could boom.
By 1840, the county was engaged in agricultural production to the exclusion of nearly all
other activities. Cotton had become the most important crop in the county and had
allowed the plantation economy and slavery to flourish. One historian of the area has
gone so far as to say that cotton allowed not only the large slaveholders to prosper, but
also permitted yeomen farmers, lawyers, doctors, and merchants to succeed. Thomas
County farmers also proved themselves to be industrious by growing sugar cane, sugar,
wheat, rice, and corn. They were so successful in these endeavors that the county ranked
second in sugar production, third in molasses, and seventh in rice production in the state
on the eve of the Civil War.44
With the county becoming nearly strictly agricultural, this led to a growth of
slaveholders, both large and small. In the 1840s, the Whig Party became the dominant
political party in Thomas County. As has previously been discussed, in Georgia the
party, whose supporters tended to be led by plantation owners and large slaveholders,
were avowed believers in the Union. They had a fierce rivalry with local Democrats,
who venerated Andrew Jackson and were often the party of the yeomen farmers and nonslaveholders. The Democrats included large slaveholders in their party, but they often
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appealed primarily to the “common man.”45 With the crumbling of the national Whig
Party in the early 1850s, the Democrats began to control the county. The former Whigs
attempted to oppose the Democrats, even dabbling with the nativist Know-Nothing party
but were never able to form a cohesive movement, much like the rest of Georgia. When
an alternative to the Democrats cropped up in 1860 with the Constitutional Unionists,
many Thomas County residents flocked to their side.
By 1860, Thomas County had 10,766 residents. Of this total, 6,244 residents
were slaves, making Thomas County one of forty-three Georgia counties that had more
slaves than whites. While the population of whites in the county had dropped by nearly
500 from 1850 to 1860, the number of slaves had grown by over 1,000. The number of
slaveholders grew by 21 in that same time, with 403 Thomas County residents owning
slaves. This was a scant 9% of the county‟s white population, but interestingly enough,
nearly 25% of the county‟s slaveholders owned twenty or more slaves, thus placing them
in the planter class. The majority of the people who owned slaves in the county owned
ten or less and this was typical of the South and state. To say that the residents of
Thomas County relied on slavery, or were at least affected by it, would be an
understatement. Much like many other Georgians and Southerners, the residents of
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Thomas County had a vested interest in the maintenance of the peculiar institution,
economically and socially.46
On the eve of the Civil War, perhaps no part of Georgia had better prospects of
continued prosperity than Dougherty County. The county seat, Albany, was a thriving
city and arguably the principal market place of southwest Georgia. The growth of the
county and city had been much more rapid and consistent than any other county or city in
the area. The local newspaper thought this had led to economic growth for its citizens,
arguing that Dougherty was the wealthiest county in the United States, with an average
capital of $22,747 per voter. Unlike nearby Thomas County, though, this economic
growth had not led to the growth of the Whig party in Dougherty. In fact, the majority of
the citizens of the county were Democrats.47
Dougherty County has its roots in the settlement of the town of Albany. The town
was founded in what was then Baker County. Albany did not grow up by mistake. The
town was a deliberate commercial venture, largely the undertaking of Nelson Tift. Born
in Connecticut, Tift worked in the mercantile business and in March 1836 went to
Hawkinsville after receiving an offer for his services. Just a few months later, in
September, Tift and a group of men entered into an agreement to found a town on the
west bank of the Flint River in Baker County. According to Tift, the town “was
commenced in October, 1836, in an unbroken pine forest by the construction of two log
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houses.” By January 1837, the town had been laid out and a steamboat made its first trip
up the Flint River from Apalachicola, Florida.48
The venture was not an immediate success. Growth was slow and life was
simple. South Carolina planter James Henry Hammond visited Albany in 1838 while
looking for places to expand his empire and found the town to be “a primitive place.”49
This benefited Tift, though, who bought up stock from holders who became discouraged
by the slow rate of growth and frontier lifestyle. However, things began to head upward
as settlers began to pour in from older parts of Georgia, and the rest of the South, where
the lands had become worn from years of cultivation. As late as 1854 new settlers were
still constantly arriving, many of whom were wealthy planters from other parts of
Georgia and South Carolina, not unlike Hammond. The rapid growth of Albany would
lead to the formation of a new county.
In less than a decade, Albany had grown to have more than 1,000 residents. This
growth was much more rapid than in other parts of the county and naturally led to
clamoring for the creation of a new county. However, it was not until 1853 that
Dougherty County was created, carved out of Baker County.

Albany quickly became a

chief rival to Thomasville for the economic leadership of the southernmost Georgia
counties. With river trade, railroads, retail stores, and a tiny bit of manufacturing,
Dougherty County had a strong economic base thanks to its county seat. However, just
like Thomas County, Dougherty relied heavily on agriculture and slavery for its
economic development. In fact, nearly 75 percent of the population (6,079 of the 8,295
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residents) in 1860 were slaves and their numbers had risen by about 50 percent from
1854 to 1859. As was typical with the rest of the South, (and southwest Georgia for that
matter), more than half the adult white males in Dougherty County did not own slaves.
Of the 322 slaveholders in the county, more than half owned fewer than ten slaves each.
This is not to say that Dougherty County did not have a large group of planters. In fact,
32 percent of all slaveholders in Dougherty were in the planter class, which was a very
high proportion. Thus, much like most other counties throughout the South, the planters,
who wielded economic power, made up a large percentage of those who held political
power in Albany and the county at large.50
The first sustained newspaper in the area, the Albany Patriot, belied the
importance of the planter class in the area. Tift, by now one of the area‟s largest
slaveholders, started the newspaper in 1845. Democratic in politics, the Patriot became
the most important newspaper in the region, both socially and politically, with a
circulation of more than one thousand after just two years. This Democratic political
base would end up being vital during the secession crisis. As with Thomas County, the
political background of the county ended up playing a large role in determining the
support for or against secession.
Dougherty County certainly fit the mold that many histories have presented of the
Lower South. The county‟s economy was clearly built around agriculture. In 1859,
Dougherty County produced nearly 20,000 bales of cotton and almost 370,000 bushels of
corn. According to census records, there were 189 farms in the county and they were
comparatively large, with only fifteen farms of 50 acres or smaller. The land of the
50
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county was proving to be as rich as early promoters such as Tift had promised and this
had led to great economic prosperity for many and the boom of slavery. Thus, the
citizens of the county most certainly had a vested interest in the political rumblings of the
time, for their economic and social concerns.51
Located on the Chattahoochee River, Muscogee County was established by the
state legislature in 1825. The county is located along the fall line of the Chattahoochee
and was tabbed for development because of this. By 1828, the county‟s seat, Columbus,
had been established and settlers began to pour in. Columbus‟ position on the fall line
made the town an ideal location for trading and the river‟s water power held great
promise for industrial development.52
In many ways, Muscogee County was typical of Georgia and the Lower South.
The county featured many large plantations and in 1860, 45% of the county‟s total
population were slaves (57% when not counting Columbus).53 Despite the
industrialization that rapidly occurred in Muscogee, the larger area was dependent upon
slave labor and cotton. Still, that industrialization did set Columbus apart. Noted traveler
Frederick Law Olmsted thought Columbus was the largest industrial center south of
Richmond, Virginia.54 In fact, Columbus was called the “Lowell of the South” due to the
cotton and textile mills located in the city.55 The planters of the county saw industrial
expansion as a positive and a new way to earn more on their capital, as well as providing
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a market for their food crops.56 By 1860, Muscogee County helped Georgia lead all
southern states in the production of cotton cloth. The county ranked third in the South in
the value of cotton textiles produced and the cotton mills were becoming the linchpin of
the county‟s economy.57
Barely three decades old by 1860, Muscogee County was the fourth largest
county in the state (out of 132) with a total population of 16,584 residents. Columbus
had grown to be the third largest city in Georgia with 9,039 residents.58 Despite its
relative youth, Muscogee County and Columbus had taken their place amongst the
leaders of the entire South. One visitor described the area as “in a fair state of
improvement and prosperity, quite an important cotton market and cotton manufacturing
point.”59 The citizens of the county had been able to devote nearly all their energies to
local concerns and this had allowed the county to prosper. However, as the 1850s
progressed, residents found it increasingly difficult to remain insulated from the great
national politics and issues of the day. Columbus and Muscogee County became a
hotbed of activity as the 1850s progressed. The county had men such as Henry Benning
that were in the forefront of the secessionist camp while other leaders like Hines Holt
were amongst influential moderates in the state.60
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Dougherty, Muscogee, and Thomas counties were all poised to take leadership
roles in southwest Georgia as the 1860 election ramped up. In all three counties, there
were certainly people who felt there was something to be gained by the election. Many
more were sure there was something that could be lost if the results did not go the right
way.

Chapter 3: “The serpent to tempt the Eve of the South to peace and quiet:”
The Election of 1860 and its Aftermath

The election of 1860 appeared to be pivotal to the future of the Union. The
Democratic Party had come close to fracturing in 1856 and with the ire on both sides that
had sprung up in the years since, many felt there was a real possibility that the only
national party remaining could dissolve. No matter their political persuasion, the people
of Georgia feared the possibility of a Republican victory, especially if men like William
Seward, who was viewed as especially dangerous after his “irrepressible conflict” speech
of 1858, were chosen as the party‟s candidate. However, just as in 1856, the threat that
all Georgians saw in the Republicans was not enough to unify as one to attempt to stave
off a Republican presidential victory. Instead, the political bickering that had been
occurring throughout the 1850s would continue.
Before the national Democratic Party had a chance to split, the Democrats in
Georgia once again were fighting among themselves. With campaigning from Howell
Cobb‟s supporters, the Democratic legislators called for a December 1859 party
convention, instead of the previously agreed March 1860 convention. Not surprisingly,
the December convention recommended Cobb for President and was met with ire from
Cobb‟s enemies. Old Southern Rights foes continued with plans for the March meeting
and planned on ignoring the recommendations of the December delegates. Fearing that
he may lose the nomination, Cobb agreed to the March convention. Cobb‟s supporters
urged county politicians to choose delegates who would back up the December decision.
What emerged was another battle between the Unionist and Southern Rights wings of the
party.

44
The in-fighting quickly led nowhere. Unable to agree on almost anything, the
convention at first voted to reconvene at the national convention in Charleston. A day
later, Cobb supporters attempted to get the convention to recognize the resolutions of the
December convention. This was defeated and the Georgia delegates would go to
Charleston with no instructions and no candidate for President. Cobb was so frustrated
that he withdrew his name from consideration.
Upon arriving in Charleston in April 1860, the Georgia delegation was divided
over what the Democratic platform should be and who should be the Democrat‟s choice
for President. Henry Benning was the chairman of the delegation and was opposed to
Stephen Douglas being the candidate. Benning also wanted the Democratic platform to
include language that would endorse congressional protection of slavery in the territories.
Unionist Hiram Warner disagreed with this, not wanting to drive off northern Democrats
with the platform and risk splitting the party.
The Democrats tackled the platform issue first. The platform committee was
controlled by southerners and offered a platform that endorsed congressional protection
of slavery in the territories. Supporters of Douglas opposed this and asked that the
Democrats go back to their 1856 platform which left the powers of Congress open to
interpretation. After debating for a week, the convention adopted the platform Douglas‟
supporters advocated. Every Lower South delegation, with the exception of Georgia,
withdrew from the convention. The Georgia delegation voted to leave the convention the
next day, but Warner, James L. Seward, and two others stayed at the convention,
although they could not vote. With the whole Lower South gone, a two-thirds majority
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could not be had for any candidate and the Democrats chose to reconvene in June in
Baltimore.
The reaction to the withdrawal was mixed in Georgia. In Columbus, Peyton
Colquitt, the editor of the Daily Times, enthusiastically endorsed the withdrawal, but John
H. Martin, the editor of the more moderate Daily Enquirer, thought the walkout meant
dire consequences for the Union and had serious misgivings. For his part, Benning
addressed a meeting of the Muscogee County Democratic Party and supported the action
of the seceding delegates. Dougherty was the first county in Georgia to approve the
action of the seceding delegates. That did not mean that the split did not cause concern.
A grand jury in Albany noted that “the condition of our government and relations existing
between the States of this Confederacy are of such a nature as to excite apprehensions
and forebodings of the most disastrous consequences. “ That being said, this same jury
recommended “our fellow-citizens to stand strictly upon principle and upon the law, but
upon no promises or by no contract to the surrender of any of our just rights under the
Constitution as decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Columbus attorney
James Ramsey went a step further, advocating for immediate secession. Many
Georgians, though, feared that the split of the Democrats would lead to a Republican
victory in the Presidential election and were not as eager for secession as Ramsey.61
Most Democrats were not willing to advocate secession but opposed Douglas‟
nomination. Howell Cobb thought Douglas‟ candidacy was the main impediment to
northern and southern Democrats coming together. Robert Toombs thought the southern
delegates had erred in focusing so narrowly against Douglas that they left themselves no
choice but to walk out and potentially ruin the party. However, Toombs thought at this
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point there was no turning back: Douglas could not be the candidate and the platform
had to protect slavery. Toombs, though, was willing to let the party dissolve if northern
Democrats could not understand the southern position on slavery. This left newer
converts to the party like Alexander Stephens aghast. Stephens felt Democrats should
stand by congressional nonintervention, thus making the fight over the platform moot. In
this thought, Stephens was backed up by Herschel Johnson and Joseph Brown, who both
thought that nonintervention had been agreed upon by the South as the policy to follow.
62

Stephens, though, was more concerned about what the dissolution of the national
Democratic party could do. Even though Stephens had secretly hoped for such an event
to occur when he quietly backed the American party, he now feared that the break-up of
the party would hand the Presidential election to the Republicans. What further angered
Stephens, Brown, and older Democratic members such as Eugenius Nisbet was that it
appeared the southern Democrats were all arguing over policy. Nisbet felt arguing over
abstractions could leave the party in ruin. Brown feared men like Toombs were
destroying the party over personal ambitions. The critics of the Charleston walk-out did
not disagree that southern rights should be maintained, but the expediency of demanding
a specific platform or else seemed foolish.63
In this atmosphere, the state convention met on June 4 to select delegates for the
national convention at Baltimore. The majority of the delegates, led by Cobb, approved a
platform that essentially asked for the same national platform the southerners advocated
in Charleston. Men like Toombs rejoiced, thinking either the northerners would bow
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down or the party was not worth saving. The dissenters did not go down without a fight,
though. Around seventy men, proclaiming themselves national Democrats, organized
their own convention and appointed their own delegation, including Hiram Warner,
Herschel Johnson, James L. Seward, and James Gardner, to go to Baltimore and
repudiate any platform that had anything to do with congressional interference.64
In the end, neither Georgia delegation sat at the convention in Baltimore. The
convention recommended seating delegates from both of Georgia‟s conventions.
However, when the majority of the Democratic convention voted to seat national
Democratic delegations from Alabama and Louisiana, most southern delegates withdrew
to create a new convention. Nineteen states were represented at this new convention and
chose Kentucky‟s John C. Breckinridge, the current Vice President, as their candidate.
The delegates who had stayed at the national convention, mostly northerners, chose
Douglas on a nonintervention platform. Georgia‟s Herschel Johnson was chosen as
Douglas‟ running mate. The split of the national Democratic party was official.65
In May, a national convention was held by the new Constitutional Union party, a
coalition of former Whigs, Know-Nothings, and others that felt politicians had created
the sectional controversy and the slavery issues could be resolved by not discussing them.
The convention chose former Whig John Bell of Tennessee as their candidate for
President. Bell would run on an ambiguous platform that essentially called for the
preservation of the Union and devotion to the Constitution. While some of Georgia‟s
non-Democrats balked at the idea of a party with no real platform, many others flocked to
the Constitutional Unionists as the only alternative to the Democrats. Whatever their
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thoughts focused on the party or the platform, Georgia‟s backers of the Constitutional
Unionists could rally against the Democrats, who they felt were the cause of the
country‟s problems. The tension between the Democrats and their opponents had been
evident throughout the 1850s but was at its height during the 1860 campaign.66
With the fracture of the Democratic Party, many in Georgia felt the contest could
only end in disunion. The Republicans may be able to win the election thanks to the
divided nature of America‟s only national party. While Stephen A. Douglas had some
support in the South, the contest in all three counties, and most of Georgia, was largely
between Breckinridge and Bell. Supporters of Bell pointed out that the Constitutional
Unionists were the only true national party and that the Southern Democrats were just as
bad as Republicans because Breckinridge supporters were viewed as radicals. Bell
supporters declared non-Douglas Democrats secessionists and “enemies of the country”,
linking them with radicals such as William Lowndes Yancey of Alabama. An “Old
Whig” wrote that the reason the “country was in trouble” was “old…political parties have
preyed on its vitals and brought it to the verge of dissolution.” In this writer‟s estimation,
the Constitutional Unionists were a breath of fresh air compared to the old parties. In
Muscogee County, supporters of Bell pointed toward Henry Benning as evidence that the
Democrats were simply hell bent on disunion. . Some supporters claimed the fire-eaters
aligned with Breckinridge leaders to purposely split the Democratic Party along sectional
lines to ensure a Lincoln victory, which would pave the way for secession. Constitutional
Unionists in Georgia were highly confident that enough men were opposed to secession
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that playing the disunion card would work in their favor.67 Ultimately, the Constitutional
Unionists argued that slavery was best kept safe in the Union and a vote for Breckinridge
would put the peculiar institution in peril.
Oddly enough, Breckinridge supporters sang the same tune. The Southern
Democrats argued that they were the best equipped to defeat Lincoln because they were
the only true national party, despite having severed ties with the northern wing of the
party. Furthermore, most Democratic newspaper editors were quick to point out that they
were not disunionists. In fact, they claimed they wanted to preserve the Union, but they
were willing to threaten secession if need be. The threat of disunion to protect southern
rights had to be kept visible but not to the point that a vote for Breckinridge was a vote
for disunion.68 The Albany Patriot‟s editor stated that the break-up of the Democrats was
due to “the friends of Mr. Douglas” both North and South. With Breckinridge and Lane
leading the way, the Union “might be saved.”69

Despite some Democrats‟ willingness

to claim secession was the only option at this point, the party leadership realized that
moderate voters were the ones who had to be won.
A large meeting at the courthouse in Albany endorsed the nomination of
Breckinridge. In October, two thousand citizens of Dougherty County attended a great
mass meeting and barbecue in support of the southern Democrat that featured speeches
by Robert Toombs and Alfred Iverson. A man calling himself “Dougherty” wrote to the
Albany newspaper to say he was backing Breckinridge because Bell and his supporters
were attempting “to mislead the people” regarding their ability to protect southern rights.
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The fiery editor of the Patriot was so confident the southern Democrat would win the
election that he offered to bet $10,000 that Breckinridge would be in the White House
come 1861. Democratic leaders throughout the state were perhaps not willing to bet
money on it, but were confident of a Breckinridge victory.70
One thing that supporters of Bell, Breckinridge, and even Douglas had in common
was to portray their candidate as the best protector of southern rights. Prominent
Columbus attorney Absalom H. Chappell publicly spoke in defense of Douglas because
he thought the Illinois Senator was a staunch defender of southern rights and the best
hope of defeating Abraham Lincoln.71 Peyton Colquitt, editor of the Columbus Daily
Times, told an audience in Dalton that the state‟s only hope was to choose Breckinridge
because only he would guard their rights. John Martin, editor of the Columbus Daily
Enquirer, heard of Colquitt‟s speech and retorted that only Bell truly represented the
South because most southerners were moderates.72 Thomas County planter and lawyer
J.R. Alexander delivered, according to one newspaper account, a “convincing, eloquent,
patriotic, and conservative” speech that advised citizens of Thomas County to vote for the
Bell ticket.73 A.J. Macarthy, editor of the Albany Patriot, argued that Breckinridge was
the only candidate that would allow “Southern rights” to triumph over “Northern
fanaticism.”74
In the final weeks before election day, rumors circulated that the Douglas and Bell
men would create a “fusion” party to prevent a Lincoln victory. Bell supporters,
especially, wrote proposals to unite the three sides into one, thinking that would be the
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best way to defeat Lincoln. Bell‟s campaign had not been as energetic or effective as
Breckinridge‟s in Georgia and Bell‟s supporters hoped the formation of a fusion party
would at least allow one candidate to beat the Republicans. The Breckinridge supporters
scoffed at the idea and opposed it unequivocally. They were sure that this was just an
attempt by their old foes of trying a new tactic to defeat their candidate.75 Ultimately no
such fusion party occurred in Dougherty, Muscogee, or Thomas counties or anywhere
else in Georgia.
The high point of the campaign in Muscogee County occurred on November 1
when Douglas and Alexander Stephens visited Columbus. Douglas had embarked on a
southern tour to strengthen the cause of Union and challenge the power of southern
secessionists. Douglas sought to combat disunion as he realized he would probably trail
both Breckinridge and Bell in many parts of the South. Though Douglas did not have
many supporters in Muscogee County, a large crowd gathered to hear him speak, but
most remained largely unenthusiastic. One local paper argued that most people
“generally turned out to hear Mr. Stephens” the next night at Temperance Hall.76
Reaction to Stephens‟ anti-secession speech was mixed. The Daily Times thought it was
a betrayal of southern rights and deconstructed his speech point-by-point while the
Enquirer thought it a “triumph of intellect and patriotism over mad, prejudiced and
excited sectionalism.”77
After much discussion, debate, and rancor, election day arrived on November 6.
Despite all the angry editorials and hot-tempered speeches of the previous weeks and
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months, voting went smoothly in Georgia. With their ballots fresh in the box, both sides
called for all southerners to join together against “the Abolition party.” After all, while
Southerners may have been divided over their support of Bell, Douglas, or Breckinridge,
at least one Columbus editor thought they all “have been united in their opposition to
this…unconstitutional organization [Republican party]” and past “minor differences
should cease.” While “we fear that the vote yesterday has proclaimed our enemies the
victors” the people of Georgia could still unify against this enemy and let bygones be
bygones.78 The fiery editor of the Albany Patriot agreed, arguing that all Georgians
should discard “passion and prejudice” in favor of “patriotism.” Of course, by patriotism,
the editor clearly meant to the state, not the Union.79 The Corner Stone did not care who
won the election. Editor James Bethune was “in favor of going out whether he [Lincoln]
is elected or not.”80 A convention in Thomas County certainly disagreed with Bethune.
The convention enacted a resolution that clearly stated that while slavery should be saved
and the North should not meddle with Southern institutions, secession was not the answer
and slavery was safer in the Union.81
When the returns came in, Breckinridge had managed a slim victory over Bell.
The Southern Democrat garnered 48.8 percent of the vote in the state while Bell tallied
40.3 percent. Douglas finished a distant third with 10.9 percent.82 Despite the
overwhelming support of the local newspapers, Breckinridge managed an even slimmer
victory in Muscogee County, with 769 votes to 767 votes for Bell. Douglas captured 160
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votes in Muscogee. Thomas County was nearly as close, with Bell holding a 37-vote
advantage over Breckinridge. When votes for Douglas were added to the mix, the
“conservative” candidates had beaten Breckinridge by 71 votes in Thomas County, a
relatively huge margin for a county that had voted heavily Democratic in the late 1850‟s.
Lucius C. Bryan, editor of the decidedly pro-Bell Thomasville Southern Enterprise,
crowed that the Bell victory was one of “conservatism over disunionism” and showed
that “the intelligence of the people triumphed.” What Bryan did not mention is that
Thomas County‟s voters had returned to their roots. With an actual alternative to the
Democrats, Thomas County‟s former Whigs and Americans had carried the day. Bryan
was so confident that the Bell victory would end the threat of secession he pledged to
stop all of the political news and pay more attention to literary endeavors. Breckinridge
had won Dougherty County easily, with 372 votes to 277 for Bell and just 26 for
Douglas. A.J. Macarthy was pleased with the “glorious triumph” of the Southern
Democrat and was confident Breckinridge would win the state by 10,000 votes.
Macarthy was probably wishing someone had taken that bet he had proposed a few
months earlier.83
An important facet of Georgia‟s political situation was revealed by the election
campaign. The disunity of the state was clear. All sides had argued that their opponents
should forego divisiveness and back one candidate. However, attempts to unify against
the Republicans were ineffective. This was certainly true in Muscogee, Dougherty, and
Thomas counties, where Constitutional Unionists and Democrats were deeply suspicious
not only of the intentions of the Republicans, but also of their local foes. Partisanship in
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Georgia was deeply ingrained and not even the threat, real or perceived, that the
Republicans posed was enough to unite the political parties of Georgia against Lincoln. 84
Within a few days of the election, before the returns had been published or were
known, it was still thought that Abraham Lincoln would be the next President. While this
was not entirely unexpected, many residents of the three counties were still stunned by
the result. Showing his disgust the victory of the Republicans, the editor of the Albany
Patriot declared that anyone who circulated Northern newspapers or uttered pro-Lincoln
statements should be hanged “to the highest limb on the first tree.”85 Albany lawyer
William E. Smith thought the outcome of the election left the South in “the hands of men
hostile to the enjoyment of Southern Rights.”86 While outrage like that of the editor of
the Patriot occurred, most people of Georgia were left almost speechless the first days
after Lincoln‟s victory. This quickly gave way to intense debate about what the proper
course of action should be for Georgia and the entire South. On average in the state,
Breckinridge supporters favored immediate secession while Bell and Douglas supporters
took a more cautious approach. Democrats felt Lincoln‟s moderate image had been
purposely designed to lull the South into complacency. Bell and Douglas supporters
were quick to acknowledge the possible dangers of a Lincoln victory but argued a
Republican administration could be tolerated.87
For secessionists, there was little to discuss. Most of them had been advocating
the disintegration of the Union prior to Lincoln‟s victory and only stepped up their calls
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for disunion. The editor of the Daily Times was sure that Lincoln would tell southerners
of “his great love for us…but he is the serpent to tempt the Eve of the South to peace and
quiet.” There was only one thing to do:
Let us not be deceived. Let us not be worshippers of a Union, whose spirit,
whose life, whose vitality has departed! Let us act like men. Let us be
equals. Let us erect, if necessary, a government for ourselves, where the
light of liberty will forever shine, and where the demon of abolitionism
will never raise his head.88

In this spirit of resistance, militia companies were being raised in Columbus, including
the Southern Guard, which was led by arch-secessionists Benning and F.W. Dillard.
Dillard also chaired a public meeting on November 9 at Temperance Hall. The Hall was
“filled to its utmost capacity” and the unanimous view was that Georgians should not
submit to Republican rule.89 The speakers urged “Southern men…to resist Black
Republican domination.” The Times bragged that the “patriotic fire, which now burns so
brightly in Columbus, could warm with its heat and cheer with its light every city, village
and fireside in our noble state.”90 As far as these men were concerned, party ties needed
to be cut so that all southerners could unite against the threat of Republican rule.
Not long after Lincoln‟s election, the debate quickly became one-sided in
Dougherty County. At a meeting in the southern part of the county, a group of planters
and other citizens resolved that due to the election of men “whose avowed purpose it is,
and who are pledged to wage an „irrepressible conflict‟ with Southern rights, and with
that institution which is the foundation of Southern prosperity and Southern society,” it
was in Georgia‟s best interest to call a convention “to act in the defence [sic] of her
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interests and her outraged honor.” The fact that the men purposely quoted Republican
leader William Seward surely hammered the point home for Dougherty secessionists.
The editor of the Albany Patriot urged “resisting the administration of Lincoln” and
promised that even if every other southern newspaper stood “up for submission,” he
would stand “immovable” and continue to advocate “resistance.”91 A meeting held at the
Albany courthouse declared that “the State of Georgia ought not to submit to the election
of Lincoln and Hamlin, pledged as they are, to carry out the policy of the Black
Republican party.”92 Planter Benjamin C. Yancey, the brother of William Lowndes
Yancey, agreed, insisting that “immediate secession” was “the only proper mode” of
response from Georgia.93
Not everyone in southwest Georgia agreed with Benning, Dillard, Yancey and the
like. The editor of the Columbus Daily Sun was not willing to make the leap for
secession just yet. Surely, the election of the Black Republicans was “to be deprecated
by every lover of the Union and good government.” However, since the Republicans did
not have a majority in Congress, it was felt there was “hope for the future” because
Lincoln was “powerless for evil” plans to come to fruition.94 At a mass meeting in
Thomasville on November 17, the majority of the citizens that attended felt a state
convention should convene to decide Georgia‟s fate, but advised such a convention to
take a cautious approach. After all, “it requires many long years…to build up a nation;
but a very few days to reduce it to anarchy, revolution and ruin.”95 Even formerly radical
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Thomas County Congressman Peter E. Love decided to chart this course. Love had
disrupted a “Friends of the Union” meeting in Thomasville, the county‟s seat and largest
town, in 1850. He disagreed with the South accepting the Compromise of 1850 and
interjected his views upon the Unionist meeting.96 Now, ten years later, he backed the
resolutions of the citizens calling for moderation. Furthermore, Love was the only
Democratic Congressman from Georgia who did not speak out in favor of immediate
secession. Love believed the South should at least attempt to save the Union and would
“cheerfully” accept constitutional guarantees of Southern rights instead of secession.97
Despite Love‟s willingness to go against party lines, this was certainly not the
norm. The presidential election campaign had shown that Georgia had partisanship and
divisiveness that could color post-election politics. Some disunionists feared that this
partisanship could lead anti-secessionists to form a Southern Republican party.98 They
further felt that secession was the only way to unify the South. The impetus was on
Georgia‟s conservative leaders to prevent immediate secession.
This partisanship and divisiveness did not go away despite the somewhat hollow
calls for unity. Democrats and former Whigs, or at least Bell and Douglas supporters,
simply took on new labels: immediate secessionists and cooperationists. Immediate
secessionists were in favor of their state seceding without waiting for other southern
states to do likewise. Cooperationists were harder to define. Some wanted to simply
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delay secession until other Southern states could come together and unify to make an
attempt at cooperation. Others were opposed to secession except as a last resort. Still
others in the cooperationist camp were unconditional Unionists.99 What united
cooperationists, though, was their contempt for immediate secessionists. They may not
agree on what course the South should take, but they certainly did not agree with
immediate secessionists charting the course.
Immediate secessionists tended to be better organized based on their more unified
position and came out firing against the cooperationists. In fact, they did not call their
opponents cooperationists, but submissionists. A.J. Macarthy, editor of the Albany
Patriot, urged southerners that would fall for “the sweet lullaby of the Union” that the
election of Lincoln would leave the South to submit to the North. Southerners ran the
risk of being slaves to the northerners and anyone who was willing to admit that
submission to the North was “Treason to the soil of his nativity” should let their “motto
be „Resistance!‟” The “rallying cry” that should “be heard from the mountains to the
seaboard…‟Lincoln SHALL NOT BE PRESIDENT!‟”100
In Thomas County, cooperationists bristled at the label and Lucius Bryan was
quick to point out that they simply opposed taking a “fatal leap into the abyss of
disunion” and thought it “cowardly” to give up their rights in the Union without a fight.
An editor in Macon argued the real submissionists were South Carolina‟s Democratic
senators, who had both vacated their seats, and had reduced the majority in Congress
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opposed to the Republicans.101 Many cooperationists further argued that the South need
not secede. After all, their best protection was in the Union since Lincoln and the
Republicans could do nothing to affect the South for they would be protected by the
Supreme Court, the majority in the Senate, and the majority in the House of
Representatives. The Republicans did not have a majority in the Supreme Court or
Congress and many cooperationists argued that would keep Lincoln and his followers
from infringing upon southern institutions. They argued the South was best served by
staying in the Union and preventing the Republicans from having their way.
By mid-November, Governor Joseph E. Brown was advocating a state convention
to decide Georgia‟s course of action. Brown called for immediate action from the state
legislature and the governor preferred secession. On November 21, the legislators
ordered a convention to meet on January 16, 1861 to decide Georgia‟s fate in the Union.
The legislature set January 2 as the date for the election of convention delegates and
adopted a resolution urging the formation of a Southern Confederacy.102 The
campaigning for delegates to the convention would bring the disagreement and debate
back to Georgia.
Almost immediately, the factions that had fought over the election of 1860 were
now fighting over the election of delegates to the convention. The names had changed
from Democrats and Constitutional Unionists to immediate secessionists and
cooperationists, but the game remained the same. The cooperationist editor of the
Columbus Enquirer questioned whether a state had “any right to quietly secede from the
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Union?”103 One of the Columbus Sun‟s two editors felt there were “remedies within the
Union of sufficient strength to cure all the ills we complain of.”104 Lucius Bryan of the
Southern Enterprise in Thomasville suggested that the delegates from the county should
be “compromise men” who would oppose “all rashness and haste.” These men needed to
be “cautious and moderate” and having reasonable men from both parties would be ideal,
but not necessary.105 Peyton Colquitt, editor of the Columbus Times, spoke for many in
arguing that secession was the remedy for the South, if nothing else than for selfpreservation.106 The divided nature of the citizens was further exemplified when R.J.
Yarrington, the other co-editor of the Columbus Sun, wrote an editorial explaining that
recent cooperationist editorials in the paper by his co-editor differed “widely and
radically” from his own views of immediate secession and future editorials would be
clearly labeled as to who the author was to avoid confusion.107 A.J. Macarthy, of the
Albany Patriot, thought Georgia had no choice but to choose secessionist delegates
because the alternative was submission to the North. “Submission is slavery,” Macarthy
wrote in an editorial, “and slavery is worse than death.”108
Letters to the editor poured in to the county‟s newspapers, describing differing
points of view. “John Hancock” wrote to the Sun to express the cooperationist point of
view. While stating that he was in favor of secession if necessary, Hancock disagreed
with the notion of separate state action. Instead, Hancock thought the South‟s only
chance at success was if the Southern states cooperated. As such, Hancock thought the
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state convention was a waste of time as Georgia would likely secede by herself and
“without any regard to what other States may do.”109 Still worse was the fact that
immediate secessionists assumed that all of the Lower South states had enough support to
secede individually. If this belief was wrong, it could lead to disaster in Hancock‟s
opinion. Hancock was simply asking for secessionists to “stop and deliberate.”110 For
this writer, the only chance at success was through cooperation.
The vast majority of letter writers in Muscogee County disagreed with Hancock.
One citizen felt that the South must secede for “her final independence, glory and
freedom.”111 Waiting for other states to join in would be folly because “each sovereign
state alone has the right to [secede] for itself, but not for another.” While Georgia could
counsel with other Southern states, she could only act for herself. The thing that bothered
immediate secessionists was the notion of not only waiting on other states to act, but also
perhaps refusing to act altogether because one of the “slave States” would “submit to
Lincoln‟s rule.”112 One of the major rallying cries was that cooperation was “tantamount
to…submission.” Several writers pointed out that Muscogee County had had three large
meetings and all three had unanimously favored “immediate, separate, State
secession.”113 Dr. John Slappey wrote to the Albany Patriot upset that the North had
“disregarded” southern rights and urged Dougherty and nearby Baker County residents to
“never submit” to Republican rule.114
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A typical moderate approach was provided by an author who urged the people of
Georgia to choose delegates without party ties to the convention and to trust these men to
decide Georgia‟s fate “in the Union if they can, out of the Union if they must.” Most
importantly, the rights of Georgia and her sister southern states “must and WILL be
secured.”115 While claiming a spirit of harmony, it became obvious that party ties did
matter to many with the fate of the state, and country, on the line. Indicative of this was a
letter to the editor of the Thomasville Southern Enterprise, written by someone calling
themselves “Decision.” The writer stated that “Breckinridge men were moving
everywhere to have secession” and that Union men would have to show up and vote or
else the convention would declare for secession “contrary to the wishes” of the people.116
This argument became popular with many cooperationists as they sought to rally what
they thought were the vast majority of moderate Georgians.
On November 24, Columbus held a large pro-secession rally that featured artillery
fire, 500 “minutemen,” closed stores, and an atmosphere like that of a “holiday scene.”117
The demonstration also featured spectators and participants wearing a blue cockade, the
recognized symbol of secession.118 Many pro-secession speeches were given, including
one by former Douglas supporter Absalom Chappell. However, the speaker that most
enthralled everyone was Alabamian William L. Yancey, considered perhaps the foremost
spokesman for Southern independence. Yancey told the crowd that “secession was right
and peaceable” and the South should secede before Lincoln took office on March 4.119
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Yancey had a friendly audience as the people of Muscogee County seemed to be favoring
immediate secession. Cooperationists were also struggling for support in Dougherty
County, but Thomas County moderates had reason to hope as November came to a close.
All knew that the month ahead would be one of great importance.

Chapter 4: “Cooperative action is yet practicable:”
The Campaign to Elect Delegates

As December began, campaigning for the delegate spots at the state convention
dominated discussion in all three counties. Secessionists like R.J. Yarrington felt that
“disunion is a matter of time and preparation” and were unwilling to “accept
compromise.” Again, the charge of submission to the North was thrown at
cooperationists, who were allegedly willing to “sacrifice…the rights and peculiar
institution of our section.”120 Peyton Colquitt felt “the tide is moving up for
secession…Georgia is too proud of her past honor and glory to submit—Her only hope,
that of slavery in its dying struggle with abolitionism, is in secession.”121 James Bethune,
editor of The Corner Stone, continued the line of reasoning that cooperationists were
really just submitting to the Yankees, but took it one step further. Bethune argued there
was “no doubt” that cooperationists “were willing to sacrifice the rights and interests of
the country for the gratification of their personal ambition.”122 A.J. Macarthy of the
Albany Patriot felt anyone who did not back secession had to admit the South‟s
“inferiority and submit.” Cooperationists were prattling on about “school boy nonsense”
and had to realize that the South had to resist the Republicans.123 The talk of all
Georgians uniting regardless of political party or outlook was quickly taking a backseat
in these heady times.
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After staying somewhat silent for much of November, the cooperationists
throughout the state finally began to rally in December. Prominent Georgians such as
Alexander Stephens and B.H. Hill spoke out in favor of cooperationism. In Columbus,
State Senator Hines Holt “denied that the election of Lincoln…was any cause for
resistance.” Holt admitted that the Southern states had suffered wrongs at the hands of
the North, but Lincoln‟s election did not “justify secession.”124 Holt went so far as to
introduce a series of resolutions in the state legislature aimed at staving off secession, but
all such efforts were defeated. Fifteen cooperationist subscribers to the Times cancelled
their subscriptions to the paper because of the “dishonorable…and dangerous” opinions
the paper was espousing.125
Advocating the cooperationist cause could be dangerous though. When
bricklayer William Stewart admitted he had voted for Bell and now was in favor of
cooperationist candidates for the convention, Dougherty County planter Thomas
Moughan and his overseer J.L. Dozier ran Stewart out of the county. Perhaps Albany
bookseller L.E. Welch, who had been born in the North, took notice. Welch burned
every issue of Harper’s Magazine he had in the middle of Broad Street.126 The audience
that watched were elated and the editor of the Patriot thought this proved Welch was
“with us.”127
The cooperationists wanted to delay the state‟s final decision to either give
Lincoln time to redress grievances or to give southern states time to unite and cooperate.
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Many cooperationists were not uncritical defenders of the Union, but they were quick to
point out that the South faced no immediate harm. Thus, in Lucius Bryan‟s opinion, the
“Precipitators” were attempting “to force all who differ with them in opinion, to go for
secession.” While this was a time where southerners should unite as one, the
cooperationists argued that these Democratic fire-eaters were leading the South down
“such a course” that would be “most ineffectual.” The “secession of the cotton States
would be a surrender of their rights” and thus moderation was the right course.128
The main problem that cooperationists were having was their contempt for
secessionist leaders. Opponents thought secessionist leaders rash, demagogic
Breckinridge supporters. According to cooperationists, the Southern Democrats were
petulant men who were risking everything to be the leaders of a new nation since they no
longer held power in the Union.129 Lucius Bryan thought the secessionist leaders clearly
sprang from “the old Democratic party” and were determined to “rule or ruin.” One
“strong Breckinridge man from Thomasville” stated that if the Southern Democrat came
and made Unionist speeches “he would be tarred and feathered.”130 Before the election,
Bryan railed, these Breckinridge supporters had claimed to be “the best Union men in the
country,” but now they were willing to disavow their own candidate for President simply
because he might consider advocating staying in the Union.131 Cooperationists argued
Breckinridge supporters were nothing but disunionists and Bell and Douglas men had
their proof in their opponents‟ actions. In fact, the upcoming state convention was viewed
as simply a way to settle old political scores. Lucius Bryan agreed with the editor of the
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Vicksburg Whig, who thought that secessionists were attempting to scare the citizens of
Georgia out of the Union, something that he viewed as “base cowardly, and unmanly.”132
Secession was considered rash because it posed economic problems and could jeopardize
slavery, among other things, but one of the biggest problems was that Democrats were at
the forefront of secessionist leadership.
Lucius C. Bryan, editor of the Thomasville Southern Enterprise, laid out the case
against secession in a lengthy editorial published December 12, 1860. Under the
Constitution, the South, he contended, had grown to “be a great, prosperous and happy
people” and was almost perfect, if not for “internal dissensions.” Even though nothing
had been done by the Federal government that would necessitate secession, Breckinridge
men, who were “not very smart,” were willing to advocate for secession for things that
might occur. And even though slavery had been a divisive topic, Bryan argued the
South‟s peculiar institution was better off for the discussion because slavery was now
defended by the Constitution and not regarded as evil. It was neither brave nor patriotic
to invite civil war for something that might happen. Yet, these fire-eaters had “rejoiced
at the split” of the Democratic Party because they believed it would end with the
“dissolution of the Union.” People who would support such men should consider
themselves “literally insane” if they thought these secessionists were leading them to
some promised land. These men were not statesmen, as they refused to even attempt
compromise and acted as if secession was inevitable. The people of Thomas County and
the entire South needed to “be cautious.”133 Bryan argued forcefully that Thomas
Countians needed to vote for cooperationists come January 2.

132
133

“Disunionism is Cowardice,” Vicksburg Whig in Thomasville Southern Enterprise, December 5, 1860.
Editor, “Ad Cap Tandum,” Thomasville Southern Enterprise, December 12, 1860.

68
With the two sides laying out their cases, it was time to choose their tickets for the
convention that would meet in January. In Muscogee County, the secessionists met on
December 11 and chose three of their familiar leaders in Henry Benning, James Ramsey,
and A.S. Rutherford as their delegates. All three were prominent men who had espoused
secession for several years, with Benning and Ramsey being avowed secessionists since
1850. Benning especially had been rallying the troops throughout Georgia. He had given
a speech on November 19 to the state legislature in which he predicted the end of slavery
by Republicans and that this would cause severe social and economic problems for the
South. Benning stated that secession would be “a complete remedy” for Georgia “and if
nothing else will save us but going out of the Union, we must go out of the Union.”134
Benning‟s speech had been met with great fanfare in Muscogee County and he had spent
the weeks afterwards traveling around Muscogee and neighboring counties drumming up
secessionist feeling.135 The secession ticket was supported by a large contingent of
citizens in Columbus as well as the Times. The small town of Mount Moriah in the
county had a meeting to adopt the secessionist candidates as their own, further bolstering
secessionist support.
On the same day the secessionists chose their delegates, the cooperationists in
Muscogee County met and chose Hines Holt, N.L. Howard, and Porter Ingram as their
representatives. The cooperationist editor of the Sun opined that due to the large numbers
of men who turned up to choose delegates the cooperationist candidates “would be
elected by an overwhelming majority.”136 The cooperationists also had the backing of the
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Enquirer, but the Times scoffed at the ticket, derisively stating that “less than a hundred
conservatives assembled” and were amazed the cooperationists would “venture to run a
ticket.”137 Holt, Howard, and Ingram all signed a letter to the people of the county stating
that they believed “cooperative action is yet practicable.”138
On Saturday, December 14, the citizens of Thomas County met to pick their
candidates for the state convention. Unlike in Muscogee, the citizens of Thomas County
held one mass meeting. The goal of the meeting was to provide three candidates that
everyone could agree upon so that when voting occurred on January 2, the decision on
who to vote for would be done already. According to newspaper accounts, citizens of all
political persuasions attended the meeting, jockeying for their views to carry the day. A
committee was formed to present candidates and the initial proposal was for Augustin H.
Hansell, J.R. Alexander, and Samuel B. Spencer to be the candidates for the convention.
Alexander declined and was replaced by William G. Ponder. On the very first motion,
the three candidates were nominated and the meeting adjourned.
Thomas Countians were opposed to immediate and unconditional secession and
this was evidenced by the choices of Hansell, Spencer, and Ponder. Hansell, Spencer,
and Ponder had all been publicly opposed to immediate secession. The secessionists
thought they had Spencer in their camp, but he stated he was “for secession „only as a last
resort‟” and had been a Bell elector.139 Spencer and Hansell were both founding
members of the Presbyterian Church in Thomasville and that could have affected their
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stance on secession.140 Spencer was a lawyer, militia officer, and owned fourteen slaves
and had come out in favor of cooperationism with full force. Still, he was willing to
support secession if the North would not guarantee southern rights and was probably the
most “radical” of the three. Hansell was the Judge of the Superior Court of the Southern
Circuit and had not held any political office. The highly esteemed lawyer was probably
the most moderate of the three delegates chosen.141 Ponder was the only planter of the
three, owning fourteen slaves in Thomas County and also maintaining an absentee
plantation in neighboring Leon County, Florida which held nearly one hundred slaves.142
Ponder had been elected to the state Senate in 1855, but had held no political office since
and had not been very active in politics. All three were opposed to immediate secession
and cooperationists thought they were “on the side of prudence and deliberation.”143 The
secessionists claimed victory, but the fact that James L. Seward, the county‟s leading
secessionist Democrat, was unhappy with the results was telling. Subsequently, he
decided to run for a spot at the convention.
Dougherty County residents met on December 11 to choose their delegates. The
meeting was designed to be similar to Thomas County‟s in that instead of having two sets
of delegates opposing one another, one set would be chosen by the majority. However,
the chairman of the meeting, D.A. Vason, stated that he would not chair the meeting
unless immediate secessionist candidates were chosen. Nelson Tift, who read the call for
the meeting, assured Vason that secessionists would be chosen and the meeting
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continued. Somewhat surprisingly, though, Tift followed this up by stating that he
thought “secession…a last resort.” William J. Lawton thought someone from the Bell
supporters should be chosen as one of the delegates and the meeting tabbed Charles E.
Mallory as that man. This was an odd choice considering Mallory, a planter who owned
thirty-eight slaves, had been published in the Albany newspaper advocating for
Breckinridge and then secession. Judge Richard H. Clark was then chosen to represent
Breckinridge supporters.144 Clark later recalled that he supported immediate secession
because of northern “anti-slavery agitation” and the Republicans‟ attempts to “wrong and
oppress the South.”145 A.J. Macarthy was pleased with the choices, crowing that the duo
would win the January 2 election by “such a majority as will make the submissionists
tremble in their boots.”146
Evidently the meeting did not satisfy cooperationists as two days after the mass
meeting that led to the choice of Mallory and Clark as secessionist candidates, Lott
Warren and Dr. S.L. Barbour were chosen as Dougherty‟s cooperationist candidates. A.J.
Macarthy was decidedly less pleased with these two men, arguing that Warren did not
favor cooperation or secession but Georgia acting alone as a separate state government.
Barbour, on the other hand, was even more deplorable as he “favors coercion by the
government of any State that may secede.” Macarthy urged Dougherty County‟s voters
not to support these two men. Otherwise, the citizens of the county may have to “load
your muskets to kill your Southern brethren!”147
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The cooperationists of Dougherty County surprisingly did not take too kindly to
Macarthy‟s editorial. Nelson Tift, who was not a cooperationist exactly but not in favor
of immediate disunion, was upset that men like Macarthy were attempting to choke off
the debate. Tift was further upset that this was leading his neighbors to call him a
submissionist. Tift was willing to back secession if Georgia could not maintain her rights
in the Union, but thought Georgians should wait a bit longer to see what happened. He
could not understand how this made him a submissionist. 148
Lott Warren and Dr. S.L. Barbour defended their position two weeks after
Macarthy‟s editorial. In a joint letter, the two cooperationists argued that the election of
Lincoln alone was not cause for secession, neither would vote for secession if elected to
the state convention, and that even if several other southern states seceded, they would
still oppose secession. Warren and Barbour argued they were not opposed to secession,
but they felt that Georgia must seek and obtain “the co-operation of the Border States”
rather than just their fellow Lower South brethren. They both felt that a convention of all
southern and border states should meet, demand slaveholding rights in the Union, and if
that was not possible, then secession could occur.149 The editor of the Patriot was only
too happy to print this letter. He felt it proved that Warren and Barbour were not the
proper candidates “to represent a constituency who felt that they endure wrongs which
require an efficient remedy.” The cooperationists were offering no remedy but rather
were “experimenting on the disease while the patient is dying.”150
The secession of South Carolina on December 20 only strengthened the cause of
the immediate secessionists. Georgia‟s Congressional representatives, with the exception
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of Thomas County‟s Peter Love, were denouncing compromise and stated that sectional
reconciliation was impossible, especially with news of South Carolina‟s secession.
Several Congressmen had signed a letter stating compromise was impossible after the
Crittenden Compromise had collapsed before the end of the year.151 Only four Georgia
Congressmen did not sign the letter and of those only Love was a Democrat. This added
more fuel to the fire that Democrats were disunionists hell bent on secession no matter
what. One newspaper editor complained that these Democrats “aggravate instead of
soften” and “let not an opportunity pass to throw obstacles in the way” of potential
compromise.152 The idea of a vast conspiracy on the part of Democrats to force Southern
states out of the Union was thus reinforced.
However, the secessionists did not appear to have to win the war of words with
South Carolina‟s decision to secede. On December 21, Columbus held a celebration even
larger than the one held in November when Yancey visited. The city was illuminated in
honor of South Carolina, there were speeches at Temperance Hall by Benning and
Ramsey, and the night was finished off with a torch-lit procession through the streets
followed by fireworks.153 The party lasted until the wee hours of the night, “the very air
was ringing with cheers for South Carolina.” It was reported that “the people seemed
wild with joy at the glorious news from South Carolina” and it was sure that Georgia
would “take her place in line among the seceding states.” The secessionist editor of the
Sun was also happy to report that his co-editor, who had heretofore been “dark and
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obscured” on secession, was now in favor of joining South Carolina.154 The political talk
even made its way down to children. Harris Chappell wrote his brother that “I have not
got mouch [sic] news to tell you as we never hear anything but politicks [sic]; I think
nearly all the people of Columbus is for scecession [sic] as theay [sic] are wearing the
cockade.”155
In Albany, the scene was much the same. On December 24 the people
“celebrated the secession of South Carolina by illuminations, music, banners, and a
torchlight procession,” according to the local newspaper. Richard H. Clark, Charles
Mallory, and D.A. Vason all gave speeches championing South Carolina‟s cause and
stating Georgia would be next out of the Union.156 A.J. Macarthy, the editor of the paper,
was giddy with excitement as he thanked God that Dougherty County did not have
submissionists who would keep Georgia in the Union “to seek further oppression and
aggression.” The secession of South Carolina, he was sure, would awaken the “faithful
and patriotic” southerners who yearned to resist “farther aggression and dishonor.”157
The cooperationists were not ready to give up, but their cause seemed lost in
many places, including Muscogee County. On December 22, Ingram spoke at a meeting
in the county, followed by secessionist candidate Ramsey. Although less than one
hundred people turned out, there appeared no doubt to one writer that the “great
enthusiasm” was “almost unanimous for secession.”158 The cooperationists were not only
having trouble garnering support, but they were also having trouble organizing as well as
the secessionists, something that held true in Georgia as a whole. There was hope that
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disunion could be averted with the upcoming election for convention delegates, but fear
that reconciliation was impossible due to secessionist leaders.
With the year winding down and the January 2 election creeping ever closer, both
sides made one last push to arouse support. The Columbus Times, which had heretofore
treated the cooperationists in mocking language, toned down its rhetoric and admitted
that Holt, Howard, and Ingram were not submissionists after all. However, the paper
could not understand why the three men continued to run when the “people of Muscogee”
were “against the…policy foreshadowed in the address of the candidates of „the friends
of cooperative resistance.‟” The paper promised that “the canvass shall neither be
embittered or poisoned” but still called the candidates “honest but deluded.”159 All the
while, the pro-secession elements of Muscogee County, and the state, acted as if
secession was a foregone conclusion and inevitable. This general assumption caused the
most rancor for cooperationists and unionists. One cooperationist felt it was better to
“fall in defence [sic] of justice and truth, than to be even victorious and triumphant in the
advocacy of error.” Secession was not the answer and it did not show “true
patriotism…without making a single struggle to maintain” the Union. To secede without
even attempting compromise seemed simply unforgivable to cooperationists.160 Dr.
Daniel Lee of Dougherty County argued that due to the financial importance of cotton,
the “true policy of the North is to let the people of the South govern themselves” in the
Union. Lee was confident the South was safe in the Union and that secession was due to
“party and fanatical impulses.”161
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In Thomas County, the cooperationists were pulling out all the stops. Published
quotes from northern newspapers “proved” that northern opponents of the Republicans
were everywhere and did not want the South to break up the Union. At the same time, in
an editorial, Lucius Bryan pessimistically proclaimed that surely “Georgia will secede”
after delegates were chosen for the convention because “the plan of the secessionists has
been successful.” These secessionists, he claimed, were ignoring “the interests of the
people” in favor of “prejudice, selfish ambition, or party ties.” Bryan warned readers that
George Washington had been scared at the prospect of building the country up, yet these
secessionists did not tremble at the “appalling magnitude” of the prospect of tearing it
apart. The editor urged Georgians not to fall for the trap and vote for cooperationist
candidates, but at the same time his editorial read like it was written by an angry,
defeated man.162
Yet, who could blame Bryan for feeling defeated? As 1860 wound to a close, it
appeared that the immediate secessionists were likely to win the majority of seats at the
convention. To be sure, Bryan and many other cooperationist leaders and newspaper
editors felt that the result of the January 2 election would not be the popular sentiment of
the people. This may sound strange considering the people got to vote, but Bryan and
many cooperationists felt the people of Georgia were being bamboozled by secessionist
leaders who continued to harp on issues that either were not true or could be dealt with
due to the Republicans not having a majority in Congress. The cooperationists, however,
somewhat had no one to blame but themselves. Cooperationist leaders such as Alexander
Stephens did little, if any, speaking throughout the state while secessionist leaders, such
as Benning, Robert Toombs, and Howell Cobb, toured their county, and often other parts
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of the state, to advocate for secession. Furthermore, the secessionists even brought in
people from outside Georgia, such as Alabamaian William Lowndes Yancey, to bolster
their campaign.
As the new year beckoned, there was both excitement and trepidation in Georgia.
Many residents realized that a decisive moment in the history of their county, state, and
country was fast approaching. On December 16, Muscogee County Douglas supporter
turned secessionist Absalom Chappell wrote his wife: “You can not form an idea what a
dead stand all business is. Cotton is no more sold here than if it were mid-summer. The
perfect stillness of things is like that which prevails…just before a mighty earthquake.”163
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Chapter 5: “They cannot represent a majority of the people:”
The State Convention

Perhaps forebodingly, January 2, 1861, dawned rainy and cold all throughout the
state as Georgians slogged to the polls to cast their votes for delegates to the state
convention that would decide whether or not the state of Georgia would remain in the
Union. Alexander Stephens called it the “worst day” for an election he had ever seen.164
Ballots were cast and the waiting game began. Peyton Colquitt was confident that “we
have done all in our power to carry the State out of the Union.” Secession was “the only
safety for the South” and cooperationists “will repent” when “Georgia has spoken.”165
James Bethune hoped for a secessionist triumph, seeing the alternative as the victory of
“allies here to help” the North “whip us in to submission.”166 Very little was written or
said by the cooperationists, thus making one think they did not like their prospects of
success.
Cooperationists feared that the storms had hampered their cause, but this was
certainly not the case in Thomas County. Ponder, Hansell, and Spencer won easily, with
Ponder receiving 419 votes, Hansell 405, and Spencer 379.167 It is interesting to note that
Spencer, considered the most radical of the three, received the fewest votes of the
cooperationists. There was no organized opposition, but James L. Seward, James
McDonald, and Henry Mitchell ran as immediate secessionists and tallied just 392 votes
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total, with Seward earning the most at just 178.168 Roughly 75 percent of the votes had
been for cooperationists. The vast majority of voters had voted for moderation, but knew
their candidates had stated they would do what was deemed best for the state, which
could include secession.
Despite their campaign throughout Muscogee County, the cooperationists were
roundly defeated when the votes were tallied. The secession ticket of Benning, Ramsey,
and Rutherford garnered 944 votes (67%) to 459 votes (33%) for the cooperationist ticket
of Holt, Howard, and Ingram.169 Still, despite the overwhelming majority, this result still
showed that secession was far from unanimous in Muscogee County. As was the case
throughout most of the state, voter turnout was much less than for the Presidential
election two months prior. In fact, nearly 300 fewer votes were cast on January 2 despite
the momentous issue at hand.170 Muscogee County was similar to other Georgia counties
that contained a major town in that these counties delivered large majorities for
secessionist candidates. In contrast, Georgia counties that were largely rural and did not
have a major town or city tended to be cooperationist.171
Reaction in Muscogee County was obviously not one of surprise. The
cooperationists, however, did not believe the sentiment in Muscogee County represented
that of the state. One newspaper editor believed that even if a majority of secessionists
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were elected to the convention “they cannot represent a majority of the people.”172 The
rationale behind this was that many candidates throughout the state had not been honest
and had not run as avowed secessionists. Instead, there were many secessionists running
as cooperationists. Therefore, if the convention did vote to take Georgia out of the
Union, it should have to be ratified by a popular vote of the citizens of the state.
Secessionist editor R.J. Yarrington thought this laughable. After all, “it is at least a
natural and reasonable conclusion, that the sentiment of the people is largely in favor of
withdrawing from the Union.” The people had spoken already and it was “evident that
submitting that result [a vote in favor of secession by the convention] to the people of
Muscogee” would be a waste of time “because the vote of the people has been already
unmistakably expressed through the ballot box.”173
Thanks to popular support and their Democratic roots, the immediate
secessionists won Dougherty County easily. Clark and Mallory tallied 281 votes to just
121 for Warren and Barbour. The editor of the Albany Patriot urged those who favored
cooperationism to rally behind the secessionist candidates since they represented the
“declared opinion of the people.” The editor was sure that the 121 votes the
cooperationists received were “complimentary.” What excited the editor the most was
that he was sure that Mallory and Clark would join with the other Georgia delegates to
“positively unite on immediate secession” from the Union.174 A letter writer agreed with
Macarthy, urging Dougherty County‟s citizens to “banish…selfish party action” to get
behind the secessionsists so the South could have their freedom.175
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When the state convention convened on the 16th, the outcome was nearly a
foregone conclusion. Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi had seceded from the Union.
Momentum alone seemed to be pushing Georgia toward secession. However,
cooperationists like Lucius Bryan felt Georgia should “view the whole ground” and chart
“her course with that dignity and firmness, which has always characterized her
movements.”176 Immediate secessionists held a numerical majority in the convention and
appeared to be better organized as well. The official Georgia vote total had been 50,243
for secessionists and 37,123 for cooperationists.177
Immediately, the secessionists dominated the convention, with pro-secession
former Governor George Crawford being elected President of the convention and
Columbus‟ Albert Lamar named secretary.178 Commissioners from Alabama and South
Carolina addressed the meeting and asked Georgia to join her sister states out of the
Union. Crawford noted in his opening speech that disunion was Georgia‟s only viable
option due to the South‟s grievances against the North.
On January 18, delegate Eugenius A. Nisbet offered a resolution to uphold
Georgia‟s “right and duty” to secede and advocated the state‟s participation in the
creation of a southern confederacy.179 This motion was a gauge to see if a secession
ordinance would pass. In response, cooperationist Herschel Johnson presented a
substitute resolution asking the convention to postpone final action until a convention of
176
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all Southern states could meet and make a coordinated action. Judge Richard H. Clark
remembered that Johnson had a “strong conviction…that for existing causes secession
was unwise, unnecessary, and destructive.”180 Johnson‟s goal was simply to stall
secession as long as possible and his substitute motion triggered intense debate. Perhaps
the key speech was given by Alexander Stephens.181 Stephens said that secession would
never receive his blessing, but it seemed obvious to him that secession was inevitable.
Both Johnson and Hansell described Stephens as a beaten man and Hansell later recalled
that “there were several members near me who had been disposed to wait a little but they
came at once to the conclusion that it was time to act” after hearing Stephens‟ speech.182
It appeared that not only Johnson and Hansell but many delegates who had favored
cooperationism were swayed by Stephens‟ speech. Following the debate, Nisbet‟s
resolution passed with 166 in favor and 130 against. All of the delegates from the
counties being studied voted in favor of the Nisbet resolution.183 With the vote in favor, a
committee with members of both factions was appointed to draw up an ordinance of
secession.
The next day the ordinance of secession was presented to the convention by
Nisbet. In an attempt at delaying secession, Benjamin H. Hill resubmitted the Johnson
resolution from the previous day, asking the convention to delay action until after all the
Southern states could convene. The vote was close, but Hill was shot down 164 to 133.
Again, all delegates from the counties studied voted against Hill‟s resolution and the way
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was paved for the secession ordinance to pass.184 With Hill‟s resolution defeated, many
cooperationists felt further resistance was futile and joined the disunionist majority in
backing secession ordinance. Nisbet offered the secession ordinance and it passed with
208 in favor and 89 opposed. Despite being elected as cooperationists, all three Thomas
County delegates voted in favor of seceding. Not surprisingly, all five of the immediate
secessionist delegates from Dougherty and Muscogee counties voted in favor of seceding
as well. Even B.H. Hill had voted in favor, but Alexander Stephens did not, staying true
to his word.185
On January 21, the Secession Ordinance was publicly signed before large crowds.
Six delegates refused to sign, but cooperationist leaders Linton Stephens, Alexander‟s
half-brother, and Herschel Johnson gave speeches backing the ordinance. The editor of
the Times was not surprised by the response of men like Stephens and Johnson. He felt
that cooperationists had been “as loyal to Southern interests as the secessionists” and
would “give all they have and hope for the South and will be found gallantly fighting her
cause when imperiled.”186 Many cooperationists had said all along they would go along
with the state and many did. However, there was worry that secession would not be as
peaceable as all of the secessionists had claimed. Further, there was also nervousness by
the editor of the Columbus Enquirer that the convention had been “a triumph of one
section” of the state “over the other” and there was genuine concern that the secession of
the state of Georgia could lead to further divisions in the state.187 There was even talk
that Georgia should not join the other Southern states in a nation because if the old Union
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could dissolve, what would stop a new Union from fracturing?188 Peyton Colquitt had an
answer, stating that “in unity, there is strength” and the Southern states would be better
off banding together and their common interests would keep them together.189
Some cooperationists in Thomas County were less enthusiastic about the prospect
of cooperation with the people they had just been competing with for national, state, and
regional offices. Lucius Bryan wrote that southerners had been talking about how they
had the welfare of the whole country at heart but had actually embarked on a “fruitless”
assault on the North. Instead of preserving the country, they had “compelled to surrender
up that country so dear to our hearts” and now “not one remains to raise a voice” for the
good of the whole country. Not so subtly, Bryan blamed the Democrats, writing that “the
victory of the enemy has been complete.”190 Bryan was so enraged that the ordinance of
secession was placed on the second page of the paper and in small type.
There was little sense of outrage in Dougherty or Muscogee counties, at least
publicly. Upon learning of the secession of the state, much of Muscogee County was
nearly euphoric. On the night of January 21 the city held its third large pro-secession
rally, only this time they were toasting their own state for leaving the Union. The
celebration was complete with fireworks, speeches, and a torch-lit parade. The Times
described the night as “thrilling, entrancing, bewildering—such alone as can be inspired
by tremendous events and the triumph of great principles.”191 The Sun noted that many
homes were “brilliantly illuminated” and the positive feeling toward Georgia seceding
was “more deep seated” than it had been during the demonstration in honor of South
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Carolina‟s secession in December.192 Muscogee newspapers were more than willing to
pass along the news that reports from the state at large were happy too, as “all quarters of
Georgia bring us accounts of jubilee and general demonstrations of joy on account of her
secession.”193 In Albany, despite unpleasant weather, delighted citizens carried “a blaze
of living light” through the streets. People gathered under flags that spelled out “Georgia
and her Rights! Liberty or Death!” While a parade marched by, including local militia,
slave musicians serenaded the revelers.194
Perhaps the Columbus newspapers were overstating the general reaction,
however. Despite railing against abolitionists and the Republicans, cooperationist
sentiment in many parts of Georgia remained apprehensive, at best, to the state‟s
secession. P.W. Alexander, a delegate to the convention from cooperationist Upson
County (whose newspaper was liberally quoted in Thomas County), went so far as to
present a resolution advocating the Union‟s reconstruction “whenever…the full measure
of the rights and equality of the people of the slaveholding States” could be guaranteed
just one day after the Secession Ordinance had been signed.195 The resolution ended up
being buried in the newly formed Committee on Foreign Relations, of which Hansell was
a member, but the idea of reconstruction of the Union would be discussed until the firing
on Fort Sumter precipitated the start of war in April. Cooperationists in Thomas County
saw reconstruction as a possibility because they felt that war was the likely outcome
otherwise. With seceded states clamoring for the federal government to abandon
property in their states, it was feared that war would commence and the states would “be

192
193
194
195

Columbus Daily Sun, January 23, 1861.
Columbus Daily Sun, January 28, 1861.
Albany Patriot, January 24, 1861.
Candler, ed., The Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, Vol. I, 262.

86
wrecked.” This upset cooperationists in Thomas County, who were willing to go along
with peaceable secession, but they had reservations about going to war. After all, as
Lucius Bryan argued, “the Seceders have declared their Secession to be peaceable,” but
were chancing war by agitating the federal government. What would be the point of
dissolving “peaceably so great and renowned a Government as this was” to only “go to
war on so insignificant a question as the territories?”196 This was obviously a shot at
Southern Democrats, who had been agitating secession over the issue of slavery being
extended to the territories for many years.

Bryan went so far as to call Democrats

“absolutely demented” for instigating the “political ruin” that had occurred.197 The editor
of the Columbus Enquirer complained that Democrats were only out “for the
accomplishment of selfish ends” and were nothing more than demagogues.198 Despite all
the calls for unity now that secession had occurred, deep political divisions remained.
Within a few weeks, the idea of Georgia being independent started to sink in but
debate raged over what course the state should take. Both the cooperationists and the
immediate secessionists jockeyed for power in newly independent Georgia. In Thomas
County, the secessionists had been in the minority, but were now loudly expressing their
views on how the state should proceed. To their opponents, like Bryan, this was yet
another example of “the leaders of that party” attempting to “hold” on to their influence
and power, only now in the independent state.199 The vitriol toward Democrats was still
there, but it was less about taking Georgia out of the Union and more about who would
control the state post-secession. The conservatives in Thomas County admitted that the
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reunification of the Union was an admirable goal, but was totally unattainable.200 The
goal had shifted from staving off secession to keeping the Democrats from controlling the
state and the South. Perhaps the goals had changed, but the ideology remained the same.
The main rhetorical battle centered on the prospect of war. The cooperationists
felt that secessionists had the South on the precipice of war and they needed to be
removed from power. Cooperationists like Lucius Bryan complained that the hotheads in
South Carolina, of whom all the leaders were former Democrats, accepted “war with all
its consequences in preference even to honorable co-operation” among the Southern
states and this could not be accepted.201 John G. Winter was a wealthy Columbus
businessman who was known throughout the South “for the boldness of his enterprise”
and “the soundness of his judgment.” 202 In this instance he exemplified the worry of
war. Winter deplored the “diabolical heresy of Secession” yet what worried him more
was the fact that secession may result in war.203 Cooperationists feared the North would
not let the South go peaceably, but many cooperationists stated that they would fight if
necessary. Secessionists were sure war could be averted, but they boldly asserted that
they did not shrink from it and were sure the northerners could, and would, be whipped.
A.J. Macarthy likely spoke for many secessionists when he advised Georgians not to be
afraid of war. Macarthy was sure war would not occur and was willing to bet that the
blood of “every Southern man from being killed in a war by the abolitionists” could be
soaked up with “a postage stamp.” Besides, Macarthy crowed, every musket in
Dougherty County could be placed “in the hands of women and little children…and they
200
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can whip every abolitionist” the North could put in the army.204 An Albany man wrote
that he was willing to fight if that was the price it took for Georgia to be free from the
North.205
No matter which camp they fell in, the underlying uneasiness regarding war was
there. This apprehension is perhaps best described by Columbus store clerk and militia
member Thomas E. Blanchard:
Georgia seceded on yesterday from the United States—the news was received
with great exultation and welcomed by the ringing of bells—shooting of cannon
& c.—how much I wish all may be settled satisfactorily—and that every thing
may soon return to its accustomed channels.206

The Southern Enterprise was filled with stories of militias being mobilized, states setting
aside funds for war, and forts and arsenals being seized. A convention met in
Montgomery beginning on February 4 to mark the formal beginning of the Confederate
States of America. The hope in Thomas County was that the forming of a central,
Southern government would lead to a “speedy termination of our suspence [sic] upon the
war question.”207 The avoidance of war seemed possible after Georgia‟s own Alexander
Stephens was named Vice President. If war was required, secessionists and
cooperationists both were stating the South must unite and preserve their rights together.
The two sides were beginning to at least agree that they would have to join together to
defend the South in the event of attack. Once the realities of war set in, it was obvious
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that the divisiveness over political matters remained and this has been recently cited as
one of the reasons the Confederacy ultimately failed.208
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Conclusion
The story of Georgia‟s road to secession can be seen in these three southwest
Georgia counties. Although Muscogee County did have more industrialization than
Dougherty or Thomas counties, the three counties still relied heavily on agriculture and
slave labor for their economies. However, this study is more useful for how diverse the
three counties were and how they are useful as examples of other counties throughout
Georgia. Muscogee County was one of the larger counties in Georgia based on total
population, but was also typical of many Georgia counties in that 45 percent of the
county‟s total population were slaves. This is typical of the state as whole, whose
population was 44 percent slave.
The one constant throughout the secession crisis was political divisiveness.
Leading up to the election of 1860, both sides claimed the other was to blame for the
crisis of the Union. Both blamed the other for the disunity of state politics. This mutual
distrust would remain after Lincoln‟s election and even after secession. Bell and Douglas
supporters, many of whom became cooperationists, claimed the Democrats wanted to
rule or ruin the country, had misrepresented themselves, and had forced secession upon
the majority of Georgians who were against it. The Democrats responded by accusing
the former Whigs of being willing to allow the South to be overrun by abolitionists who
were out to rob the South of their life and liberty.
This political divisiveness holds a clue to understanding why all three counties in
this study elected the candidates to the state convention that they did. Thomas County
would elect cooperationist candidates to represent them at the convention. While it is
true that all three delegates voted for secession once they were at the convention, all three
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were avowed cooperationists. Despite writing a brief memoir, Augustin Hansell never
stated exactly why he changed allegiances. However, his description of Alexander
Stephens‟ speech showed how much of an effect Stephens‟ statement that secession was
inevitable had upon cooperationists. Thomas County historian William Warren Rogers
believes that all three delegates voted for secession despite their previous allegiance
because it was obvious there was “no turning back.”209
Regardless of the delegates, the historiography tries to tell us that Thomas County
was the quintessential secessionist county. It was in the Lower South, was largely
dependent on agriculture for its relatively great wealth, had many large slaveholders in
positions of power and influence, and the majority of the population were slaves. Despite
all of these factors, the majority of the citizens of Thomas County voted for Bell or
Douglas in 1860 and voted for cooperationist candidates in 1861. Certainly, there were
many factors why they did this, but long-standing political allegiance played a vital role.
Although the county had voted for Democrats in the late 1850s, it had long been a
stronghold of Whigs and this influence returned when secession reared its head. While
this is true of just this one county, it is indicative of why cooperationism or Unionism
could flourish in a black belt, Lower South area.
On the opposite side, studying Muscogee and Dougherty counties provide equal
answers as to how southwest Georgia counties came to support secession. Muscogee
County had seen a shift in sentiment during the 1850s. Henry Benning, Martin Crawford,
and James Ramsey had all supported secession in 1850 at the Nashville Convention, yet
Benning was resoundingly defeated by a unionist when running for a Congressional seat
later that year. The people of Muscogee County had repudiated secession. However, by
209
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the end of the decade the sentiment had shifted. In 1859, Senator Alfred Iverson, of
Columbus, had given a speech at Griffin, Georgia, advising the formation of an
independent nation of slave states.210 Muscogee County voters handed Iverson a
victorious bid for re-election the following year. While the states‟ rights candidate in the
election of 1860, John Breckinridge, only won the county by two votes, the voters gave
an overwhelming majority to the secessionist candidates to represent the county at the
state convention in January. In 1850, the people of Muscogee County were not ready for
disunion and were largely indifferent to national affairs. By 1860 and early 1861, the
majority of the people were active and passionate participants and favoring the
secessionist cause. However, there was always a sizable minority on the other side of the
issue and this led to fierce debate in the county. Still, the shift in sentiment over the
course of the 1850s kept course with the advancement of the Democratic party in
Muscogee County.
Dougherty County had remained committed to at least the idea of secession since
1850. The county was led by Southern Rights Democrats who were not willing to say
that disunion had to occur in 1850, but they were willing to threaten it and had a receptive
audience. Dougherty County voters supported Southern Rights politicians like Nelson
Tift and R.N. Ely throughout the 1850s. By 1860, even before the election had occurred,
influential citizens such as Judge Richard H. Clark, Charles Mallory, Ely, A.J. Macarthy
and others had been advocating secession. The people of the county apparently listened
as Dougherty was the first county to commend the Georgians who left the national
Democratic convention in 1860. Dougherty County residents would stay true to their
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Democratic roots as they overwhelmingly chose Breckinridge for President and
secessionists as their convention delegates.
The three counties discussed in this work supply evidence that the battle over
secession was yet another battle of political parties, just with new names. Class conflict,
economic factors, and geography have previously been cited and certainly played a role,
but political divisiveness and party affiliation need to be studied more carefully to see
what role they played in Georgia‟s reaction to Lincoln‟s election and subsequent election
for delegates to the state convention.
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